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Foreword
President Kennedy has expressed the determination
of the United States to "keep disarmament high on our
agenda-to make an intensified effort to develop acceptable political and technical alternatives to the present arms race," and, as a significant step in that direction, to achieve an effective nuclear test ban treaty at
an early date.
This pamphlet describes the most recent efforts of
this Government to bring those policies to successful
fruition, as reflected in statements and addresses by
some of the principal U.S. officials charged with their
execution.
The serious student of the problems of disarmament
and a nuclear test ban treaty should find this document
a source of essential information as to specific aspects
of negotiation, the basis of U.S. policy, and the philosophy underlying American proposals in this field.
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The Call for Leadership
BY

JOHN J. McCLOY

IT is a great, if exacting, honor to be asked to deliver the keynote

talk to such an assembly of industrial leaders as we have here
today. You have come from many areas of the globe and you
represent, I should say, as distinguished a group of business
thinkers as it is possible to gather together at anyone place and
at anyone time. It is a hopeful sign that in these momentous,
and perhaps perilous, times a nongovernmental group such as
this is prepared to come together and exchange thoughts during
the days of conference.
The pamphlet guide for this conference states that I am expected
to review the major economic business and industrial problems
which confront the world and stress what business leadership
should do about them. This gives one a most generous leeway,
to say the least; yet somehow I do not feel, broad as it is, that it
is a fitting subject for me to talk about here today considering the
condition of the world which now faces all of us. Certainly a
mere discussion of standard concepts and conventional approaches
to the solution of business problems is hardly the proper .order of
the day with the renewed rumbling of nuclear explosions in our
ears and the steady increase of the ominous events which crowd
the headlines. I dare say that there is no one among you, whether
he be a native of or a visitor to this country, who is not deeply
preoccupied with the serious international situation which we have
seen developing during the last few months.
Dealing with something which is so much more political than
industrial probably cannot properly be called keynoting this meeting, but I suppose it is difficult to list anything more important
to industry the world over than the political conditions under
which it operates. At any rate, I have determined in place of my
assigned subject to speak of things related more to the political
than to the industrial conditions we now face in this world.
It seems inconceivable, but it is a fact that we today find our1

selves again face to face with threats of another war-a bare 16
years after the close of the last one. IIowever high our hopes and
firm our determination to do all possible to avoid it, we cannot
blink the fact that the situation is serious.
What is the nlalady that so plagues human society that we have
so frequently to face the threat of war? In my lifetim'e I have
taken part in two world ,,"aI'S, in each of which, at least so far as
the United States and those who fought with the United States
were concerned, the result ,,"as a total victory. In each case we
felt, as 'we endured the struggle, that if ,ye could but a.chieve the
victory, the future would be nlade secure from further war. After
each, there was a universal determination to establish the means
by which 'wars could be avoided. Serious efforts were made to
erect institutions and to bring about a condition where resort to
force or threats of force in the settlenlent of international disputes would be outlawed. How dislnally we have failed!
'Vhat is "Tong with the world's thinking and its statesmanship?
In all conscience the "ea pons of the last war were horrible 'e nough
in their devastating effects to ilnpel men to abjure their use again,
but when compared to those we now know how to e.m ploy, they
might almost be termed primitive. Ilow ca.n the lnunan race keep
doing this to itself? There are probably a nlunber anlong you who
think they can foresee the consequences of a thermonuclear war,
but I doubt that there is anyone in this auclience who truly can
give any dependable appraisal of ,,-hat the total effect of such a
war woulcl be upon mankind. The combination of blast, conflagration, fallout, and the disruption of the services by which human
beings have come to live is so incalculable that I doubt if any finite
mind can grasp either the fact or the inlport of such "an event;
and yet we do not have the reliable substitute for such a futile
and suicidal means of settling our disputes. The question confronting us is what is to be done about it, and there is a griln
urgency pressing for the solution.
""\tVe may slide by the olninous Berlin a.nd German problems by
a means not yet too clear, but what about the next crisis, for these
things have a dangerous habit of following one another. It is
not reasonable to expect that ,ye can indefinitely nlove from one
crisis to another, always averting disaster only throngh the deterrence involved in a nice balance of terror.
On the last day of 1960 I retired frOln the chairmanship of a
bank with the thought that the tilne had come in my life where
others could well take up nly duties of administration and I could
devote myself to the performance of those tasks 'which I most
2
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wanted to do. I was not seeking a pasture by any rneans, but I
did labor under the illusion that I could devote a little more time
than before to reading, good companionship, hunting, fishing, and
a more normal fanlily life and so on. You know that refrain-it
takes the form of hearing yourself say that you ,vill only choose
the law cases and only deal with the problems which are interesting and appealing to you and which yonI' now ripened judgment
will enable you to dispose of with a certain dignified but moderate
effort. And then with no ,,~anling I ,vas asked to become an
...\.dviser to the President on matters of disarmament in a period
,vhen the ,vhole prospect of disarmament, international understanding, and confidence in a divided world was at a very low ebb.
A good part of my previous Government experience had been with
armaments-preparing the country for ,var or helping maintain
the country in war as had been the experience of many of those
I see before me today. I had a rather clear insight into "That ,vars
and Inodern weapons, including atomic weapons, could achieve,
and it required little argument to convince me how' profoundly
necessary it was for mankind to seek the means of ridding itself
of this scourge if we were to hold forth to those who take our
places in this world the prospect of living their lives in decency
and peace.

The Complexities of Disarmament
For over 8 nlonths now I have been stnlggling with this matter
of disannament, and I am prepared to say that I have never faced
as complicated, as difficult, or as challenging a problem in or out of
business, in or out of war, in or out of the law as this one. It
involves or could involve every aspect of our national life-foreign policy, defense policy, economic policy-indeed, our 'vhole
social structure. I USe the term "disarmament," of course, in its
widest sense to include the reduction or eliInination of arms, the
control of arms, and the maintenance and improvement of our
peacekeeping machinery.
The President asked me to advise him not only in regard to
policy in respect of disarmament but also to make recommendations as to the form of organization within the Government which
should be set up in order to deal with this mighty issue. This
I have attempted to do, and the bills no,v before the Congress
to set up a statutory agency to deal ,vith this question are the
result of the President's acceptance of these recommendations.
3

And if one may ask why the President is requesting the Congress
of the United States to set up such an agency at the same time
we are building up our strength in the face of threats of ,var,
I believe the answer is that it is now of all times that we should
examine seriously this matter of disarmament to see if it can
advance us toward the achievement of a peaceful world.
Disarmament and its attendant problems have been with us
in one form or another ever since the close of the war-every
United Nations meeting deals with them, and in the coming sessions of the United Nations the issue will again crowd the docket
and there will probably be a large number of resolutions put
forward about it induced by a wide crosscurrent of motives. We
have .had international negotiations going on, sometimes two or
three at a time, dealing with the subject, and we have used a
variety of means and methods to make progress with it. Some,
I.am forced to say, were devised on too short notice and with too
little preparation to cope with the seriousness of the problem and
its manifold complexities.

Geneva Test Ban Negotiations
The first problem with which the new United States administration had to deal was the test ban negotiations at Geneva. It
took the most intensive effort to work out a definite and practicable position, clear it with the many agencies of Government
which had a deep and lively interest in the subject, do the same
then with our allies and associates who with us share responsibilities for the security of the free world. By dint of much scientific
analysis, careful consideration of many security problems, we
were, in good time, able to put forward a proposed treaty for a
test ban which I felt that any nation seriously determined to
find a means for banning future nuclear tests could readily accept.
It was made possible by the convocation of scientists and the
experts knowledgeable in this field, and I do believe' that no obj ective individual or group with an awareness of the factors
involved can escape the conclusion that the United States made
every reasonable effort, including the granting of solid concessions, some of them involving real risks, in the hope of achieving
agreement. I think our position at Geneva amply demonstrated
our willingness and determination to effect an agreement that all
could live with. It is futile to recount the weary and frustrating
course of those negotiations at Geneva. President I(ennedy, the
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Secretary of State, Arthur Dean, and all of us held the highest
hopes for a prompt conclusion of an agreement which might well
have been the significant forerunner of further agreements
which could have led both to the relief of some of the burdens
of the arms race and to the significant lessening of tensions.
I repeat, I do not see how the President of the United States
could have clung more tenaciously than he did not only to the
. hope of concluding an agreement but of adjusting his position
to meet any reasonable demands of the Soviet Union.
It now transpires that from the very beginning of the talks
the Soviets had no interest in concluding a treaty ban. And the
nature, speed, and number of the recent Soviet nuclear explosions
make it abundantly clear that all during those negotiations the
most elaborate preparations had been going on in the Soviet
. Union for the resumption of tests. We informally, but none the
less sincerely, offered on several occasions to permit Soviet observers to check for themselves, to confirm the fact that we were not
testing, provided they would permit similar observations in the
Soviet Union, but to no avail-a circulnstance which now can be
better understood. This whole sorry affair is bound to cast doubt
on the prospects for other agreements. The fact that the Soviet
Union now seeks to merge test ban talks with talks on so-called
comprehensive disarmament, after they themselves demanded a
separation of the two 3 years ago-a demand to which we earlier
reluctantly agreed-accents the time we have lost and the discouraging nature of the exercise in international negotiation
through which we have just passed. I think that this phenomenon is one of the most unfortunate developments which has
occurred in the history of man's recent search for constructive
steps in the field of disarmament.
We have assumed risks during this long period of negotiation
because we conformed to a moratorium on tests of all character,
whether above or below ground, when it was quite clear that we
with our open society could not and would not conduct clandestine tests, while it was next t o impossible for us to know whether
the Soviets were testing secretly. Since their heavy control over
the dissemination of information within their country continues,
we have to insist upon reasonable verification measures within
the Soviet Union if we are to know that obligations are being
fulfilled. In spite of many protest ations of willingness to install
strict control measures, we have found when it comes t o the actual
agreement and implementation of them, as in the test ban, they
are promptly repudiated as being attempts at espionage.

s

u.s.

Determination To Halt Arms Race

I mention all this not by way of recrimination but to add further evidence to the already imposing array of facts to show that
the United States, contrary to incessant charges, has n10re than
proven its seriousness and determination to get ahead with the
reduction of the arms race as a contribution to the maintenance
of peace. We have, it is true, constantly stressed the need for
controls, and it is in this feature that we have met the greatest
obstacles in our talks with the Soviet representatives. Constantly
the charge of espionage has been cast because as practical people
we have sought to find the means whereby disarmament can really
take place with the assurance that obligations were being fulfilled. I cannot conceive of a better demonstration of the need
for controls and verification, and of the need for careful analysis
of general statements of willingness to submit to them, than is
given by t he Soviet conduct in the test ban negotiations.
What continually dumfounds me is the fact that our conduct
and actions in the way of actual disarmament, so deeply contrasting with the facts as related to their armament, seem to mean
nothing in the face of the mere statements of Soviet desire for
disarmament. I know of no more striking example in history
of a determination 'to lay aside the implements of war than was
contained in the Baruch Plan where, after alone achieving the
invention of the atom bomb, we sought immediately after the
war to subject it and all the Inaterials which could aid in its
production to strict and clearly defined international control.
Ho,v in the face of this and our record of deep reduction of our
forces and armalnent after both "Vorld War I and 'Vorld 1-Var II,
when others retained theirs, 've can justly be accused of threatening the peace of the world by the maintenance of large armaments
I fail to see. I fail to understand it, but the fact is we frequently
are, or at best we are equated with those who have never done
as much.
The Inost effective and the lllost drastic exanlples of disarlnament in history made by any great po,Yer have been made by
the United States. The charge has, as a Inatter of fact, frequently been leveled at us with some justice that we have prejudiced the cause of peace because ·we have disarmed so promptly
and so rapidly after the passage of the eIllergency. "Ve demobilized over 11 l11illion men in a little over a year after World
'Var II, while the Red Army was maintained at a level so high
that in relation to ours it simply did not disarm.
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The fact that there has been a rather prevalent opinion abroad
among those who go under the title of "unalined" that the Soviet
Union, of all nations, has been more sincerely devoted to the cause
of disarmament than ,ve. is simply another tribute to the power
and persuasive effects of incessant propaganda and in some cases
to the extreme hesitancy of many nations who cherish their nonalinement to express any open criticism except in one direction. I
really shudder to think what form the resolutions from Belgrade
would have taken had the United States been the first nation to
resume testing-and in the atmosphere at that. There is a certain
WTy complilnent involved perhaps in the fact that more is expected of the United States than from others, or even in the fact
that there is less to fear from us. It is not too warming a compliment, however, nor is it particularly well designed to induce
restraint upon the other party.
All this is most discouraging, but the obligation to continue
to search for the solution is clear; and if we are to deal intelligently and practically with this matter of disarmament with the
,vorId in the state in which it is no\y, it seems obvious that we
must be certain that we are well equipped to do it. It requires
study and skill to make our own sensible proposals, and the same
requirements are needed if we are to analyze correctly those
proposals which are made to us. The subject dernands continuity
of thought and preparation. "Ve need the highest order of talent
in the scientific field; we need the best strategic thinkers we can
find; we need skillful draftsmen and negotiators; we need statesmen aware of the forces and opinions whieh play about the
,Yorld. Our security, if not our survival, deInands it. It is far
too vital a subject to be buried in a subordinate bureau of an
existing GoverIunent department, and I say this to other governments as well as IUY own. And you understand I am not talking
of the United States alone when I say "our." I aIU talking of the
free world-all of that world that wants to live in peace and
freedom. It is dangerous to come forward with an ill-thoughtout proposal to meet a particular negotiating due date, and on
the other hand it is not enough to refuse to take any action at all
,vhene the situa.tion clearly demands that we should. Security
can be prejudiced either way.

A Disarmament Agency
Perhaps I have dwelt too long on this subject, but it does in
my judgment carry some deep implications for you as leaders
7

in your respective countries, and as industrialists, and I grow a
little sensitive when nlany of my friends say, "Why is McCloy,
who has been so long involved in preparing for the defense of
our country, asking Congress no,v of all times to pass a bill setting
up an agency to deal with disarmament problems?" I believe
I have already indicated the answer, but you may have noted that
the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously reported out
this last week such a bill and it passed the Senate with a large
majority. I think it is interesting to note the type of men who
testified in its favor. First there was the President's own strong
message. It was warmly endorsed by President Eisenhower, by
General Lemnitzer, by Secretary ~fcN alnara, by Under Secretary
Gilpatric of the 'Defense Depart.ment, by General Gruenther, by
General Clay, by General Ed Hull of Korea fame, by Secretary
of State Rusk, by former Secretary of Defense Lovett, by former
Secretary of State Herter, by Alnbassador Cabot Lodge, by Tom
Gates, former Secretary of Defense, by Fred Eaton, a former
negotiator at Geneva, by Ambassador 1Vadsworth, also a former
negotiator, and others of similar standing. These men certainly
cannot be considered insensitive to the security needs of the country and of the times. Their character and experience is another
demonstration of the attitude with which serious men, all of
whom have been charged at one time or another with the protection of this nation's security, view the problem which not
only this nation but mankind faces in this thermonuclear era.
But disarmament is not alone the answer to the cause of peace.
History will show, I believe, that some wars have been induced
by disarmanlent rather than by armament. Disarmament itself
is not synonymous with peace or with the millennium. It could,
if improperly implemented, produce disaster; but if continuous
and prolific arming with thermonuclear and other nlass destructive
weapons is not stopped, and if we do not find the honorable
substitute for war, one day it is almost inevitable we will all
share disaster. Concurrent with any drastic development in
disarmanlent, there must be erected a better method than we now
have for maintaining the peace. We have to' have better and
more freque.ntly accepted means of set.tling our international disputes. Unless we do, we shall never have full, 01"1 should say
perhaps even significant, disarmament. vVe may have some forms
of arms control, but even here these can readily be swept away if
we do not find the means wherein our procedures for settling our
international disputes are effective and at hand.
8

There are some who will say that this is Utopian, that great
nations willl].ever submit what they term their vital interests to
any form of adjudication they do not control. I recognize this
creates problems, for us as well as for other nations, particularly
the Soviet Union; but the alternative with the existence of 100
megaton bombs (5,000 times as great as the Hiroshima bombit is not clear that we could not make one 50,000 times as big) or
the use of refinements in bacteriological, chemical, and radiological
warfare, some developments of which likewise defy imaginationbut the alternative, I say, is a very real and a very sinister one.
Viewed in this light, it may make the search for better means of
settling our differences seem much less Utopian and much more
necessitous.
I am not going to speak of Berlin. We all can sense the seriousness of that situation, unless we just refuse to think about it. All
should know that we do not intend to surrender our rights, and
we all should now know something, at least, of the intent of the
leaders of the Soviet Union in regard to Berlin and Germany.
We all know that we are not dealing only ,vith the fortunes of a
single city, or only with Germany, for that matter. We know
we are dealing with the standing and integrity of the whole free
world. The subject is too delicate for us to be proffering solutions
from this platform, but as businessm-en we no longer can continue
to look only at the industrial problems of the world and think
we are doing our full duty or, as we are prone to call it, "minding
our business." There may very well be no industrial problems to
worry about if we do not look up from our concentration on producing and marketing problems and start thinking right a way as
to ho,v we are to solve t.he greater issues vlith which the world is
now faced and will be faced perhaps before our industrial problems can be solved.
In the first place we have to recognize that there has developed
a deep cleavage in the ,vorld-ideological, economic, and social.
It is one of the great developments of history. We find great
areas of the ,vorld emerging frOln a protected, underdeveloped
state into independence with an intense desire to share the affluence of a life of whose existence they have only recently become
aware. It is the era of rising expectations. And in addition we
are faced with a tremendous population explosion with its attendant needs and demands. This explosion is not very far ahead,
and it is an explosion which may also be nleasured in megatonage
so far as its effects on mankind are concerned. And we are faced
with the need for meeting the threats of cataclysmic war.
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"Vhere does industry and business fit into all this turbulence?
1Vhat is our obligation and our imperative? I do not know the
answer, but son1ehow in this connection I am reminded of that
story they tell of Carlyle when someone reported to him that a
fan10us lady philosopher and critic of the day, Margaret Fuller,
had finally decided she ,vould accept the universe. "By Gad, she'd
better!" said Carlyle. Business and industry had better pause
and look at the universe and its condition, for the very environluent in which it lives and moves is taking on SOlne extremely
menacing shapes. Its ills are becoming too much for just the
statesmen of the world to deal with, luuch less the statesmen of
anyone nation to deal with, however strong and wealthy that
nation may be. Vast challenges lie right ahead. We can see the
economic and scientific challenges right on our doorstep. There
is a dynamism bred of a movement which is stirring vast numbers
of people situated in some of the largest areas of the world, and
the industry of the free world must find its proper relation to it.

The Common Market
I feel that the organization of the Comlnon Market and the
unification of Europe may point the way, may give us the direction light for our course. We have seen ho,v dangerous dictatorships n1ay hecome, how unreliable they are, how frequently they
breed excesses and ,vars. If they can marshal great 111a5SeS of
people, which they bid fair to do, does not the free "orld have to
set about the organization of its resources, hun1an and material,
in a far better form than ,ve have thus far advanced? We are
experiencing now the difficulties of coordinating a policy between
this continent and the European Continent. At the same time
there are tremendous forces doing their utmost to divide us and
frustrate our determination and our strength. The European
Continent is itself painfully far from having and asserting the
unity the times den1and. There is still an outdated inclination
in Europe to dwell on its own weakness. For too many years, in
my judglnent, Europe has been insisting upon this weakness and
its inability to playa n1ajor part in the determination of world
affairs. 1Vith over 200 million people, with resources and capacities which n1ake those of all Russia and China quite measurable,
with the finest accumulation of technical and managerial skills
that probably exist anywhere, with cultural and artistic reserves
that still lead the ,vorld, wherein does the ,veakness of Europe
10

lie except in lack of cohesion, in lack of proper organization and
ability to express its strength. And ,vhen this great reserve of
strength, properly organized and speaking with the general
unanimity which its common position and interest should, with
proper effort and will, make possible, is added to that of the
American Continent and the British Isles and other parts of the
free world, all other combinations fall quickly into a much less
imposing perspective.
There would be no thought of attacking such strength if it ,,,ere
clear that it was determined to protect its common interest and
heritage. Not only would the problem of peace in this world be·
advanced, but most of the problems of the underdeveloped nations
of the world would promptly be brought into far better control.
No other group could approach the capital resources, skills, or
the markets on which improvement in these areas will depend.
All this sounds like a large order, but what has already been
accomplished in Europe is an indication of what the energy of
a relatively few lnen and minds can achieve, and the times
demand large orders in view of the threats which beset the free
world.
I read a book the other day ,vhich I am sure many of you have
read. It is Clarence Randall's Folklore of Management. It is
not a profound book perhaps, but it is a very readable one, and
it explodes a number of the fetishes ,yith which industry and its
leaders have been deluding themselves in the face of an interdependent, changing, and menacing world. There should be a
counterpart or counterparts of that book, and I can think of their
titles right a way. One should be written entitled the "Folklore
of Politics" and another "The Folklore of Labor." The point
is that the tiIne has come to reappraise all our compartmentalized
thinking, and rapidly.
Your presence here in such nUlnbers and distinction is a clear
indication that yon have, like Carlyle's lady, accepted the ,vorld.
Yon know yery well it is n10re than the industrial, commercial,
and economic aspects of the ,vorld that now demand your attention. The emergence of the ultimate weapon, the challenge of
space, the great ideologica.l conflict, the rising expectations of
billions of people, the increase in the world population, the development of science, the threat of suicidal war, the still unorganized potential of the free world, the need to preserve and
carryon the mighty revolutionary traditions of the freedom of
the individual which once again are being threatened-are not
11

these the keynotes which any such distinguished group as this
gathered in these days should weigh and consider no matter what
else may be on the agenda for discussion ~

12

Working Toward a World Without War
BY

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

is one of our oldest institutions. It is deeply imbedded
in the traditions, the folkways, the literature, even the
values of most all countries. It has engaged talented men and
produced national heroes. At the same time, civilized men and
women for centuries past have abhorred the immorality of organized killing of men by men. Yet let us confess at once, to our
common shame, that this deep sense of revulsion has not averted
wars; nor shortened one by a day.
While I do not say that all wars have been started for unworthy purposes, let us also confess-morality to the side-that
most all past wars have served to promote what was conceived
to be the national or princely or religious interests of those who
fought them-or at least those who won them. For in past wars
there have been winners as well as losers, the victors and the vanquished, the decorated and the dead. In the end, valuable real
estate and other riches have changed hands. Thrones have been
won, regimes transferred, rule extended, religions and ideologies
imposed, empires gained -and lost, aggressions halted or advanced.
Thus wars in the past have sometimes been a means of settling
international disputes, of changing political control, of inducing
social transformation, and even of stimulating science and
technology .
And I suppose that on moral grounds it is only a difference of
degree whether millions are killed or only thousands-whether
the victims include children in the debris of a big city building or
only young men lying on a battlefield in the countryside. N or has
war been a very efficient way of settling disputes. Yesterday'S
enemies are today's friends. First the victor pays for destruction
of his enemy, then for reconstruction of his friend.
But war in the future would differ fundamentally from war in
the past-not in degree but in kind. It is this which seems so
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difficult to grasp. Thermonuclear war cannot serve anyone's national interest-no matter how moral or immoral that interest
may be, no matter how just or unjust, no matter how noble or
ignoble-regardless of the nation's ideology, faith, or social
system.
It is no satisfaction to suggest that the issue of morality in war
thus has become academic. Yet this is the fact, and perhaps it
will serve to clarify the dialog of war and peace. For we can
now free our collective conscience of nice ethical distinctions and
face the stark, amoral fact that war has ceased to be practical, that
no nation can contemplate resort to nlodern war except in defense
against ' intolerable exaction or aggression. Therefore we must
abolish war to save our collective skins. For as long as this nuclear
death dance continues, millions-tens of millions-perhaps hundreds of millions are living on borrowed tiIne.
I suggested a moment ago that war is such an ancient institution, so deeply entrenched in tradition, that it requires a strenuous intellectual effort to imagine a ,vorld free from war. So it
does, and I shall have more to say about this later. But I submit that the alternative effort is to imagine a world at the end
of another war, when great areas and great places have been
turned into radioactive wastelands, when millions upon millions
of people are already dead while debris from those great mushroom clouds drifts ghoulishly over the living, when great parts
of our institutions, ideologies, faiths, and beliefs-even our art
and literature-lie snlashed in the smoke and rubble of material
destruction.
I submit that, however difficult the vision of a world without
. 10ar may be, it is not only a happier but an easier vision to imagine than one of a world after war. In any event, we must choose
between them.
It is against this bleak reality that we meet once again, Mr.
Chairman, to take up the subject of disarmament.

History of .D isarmament Negotiations
The story of man's efforts to do . a ,yay with armaments is a
long and sorry one. At various tinles this or that measure of
disarmament has seemed within our grasp. My own country has
a proud record in this respect. vVe supported the two Hague
conferences. We took the lead in naval disarmament after World
War I. 'Ve did our ut.most to make the comprehensive Disarma14

ment Conference of 1932 a success. And after World War II
we stripped our armed forces to the bone in the hope and belief
that we had made some progress toward a peaceful world.
Disarmament was one of the first orders of business for the
United Nations. Fifteen years ago, at the first meeting of this
Assembly, the United States delegation, of which I was a member, made a proposal as revolutionary as the scientific discovery
which prompted it. At that time we proposed to destroy the
few atomic weapons ·which the United States alone possessed, to
outlaw forever the manufacture of such weapons, to place the
development of atomic energy in all its forms under the full
control of the United Nations, and to turn over to this Organization all facilities and all information bearing on atomic science
and technology; all this to prevent an atomic arms race.
The world does not need to be reminded here of the tragic
consequences of the rejection of that initiative of a decade and
a half ago. Since then there has been a long series of commissions, committees, subcommittees, and conferences, inside the
United Nations and out, which have tried to deal with the question
of general disarmament and first steps toward it.
After the Sov:et delegation walked out of the 10-power general
disarmament talks in June 1960, our main hopes were focused
on the 3-power negotiations at Geneva for a treaty to ban the
testing of atomic weapons. After 2112 years of patient negotiations, in the course of which significant progress was made, the
United States and Britain tabled a comprehensive treaty which
they had every reason to believe would meet the remaining points
of difference with the Soviet Union. The United States and
Britain were prepared to sign a comprehensive treaty at onooand still are.
Then on the last day of last August came the shocking news
that the Soviet Union would break the moratorium which it had
advocated and vowed never to break. The United States and
Britain immediately offered to agree with the Soviet Union to
ban at once all tests in the atmosphere without inspection-to
spare mankind the hazards of radioactive fallout. We regret.
that, like the Baruch proposals, this offer was also rejected by
the Soviet Union.
Since that time the $oviet Union has carried on a series of
nuclear weapons tests ·with unprecedented pollution of the atmosphere. It was clinlaxed by the explosion of history's most appalling weapon, a superbomb of more than 50 megatons, or more
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than 50 million tons of TNT. This weapon's destructive power
exceeds any known military requirements. So its principal
purpose is to serve the political strategy of terror.
This action was taken in disregard of pleas from governments
and peoples all over the non-Communist world-and, finally, in
defiance of an unprecedented resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly supported by 87 nations.
To all our pleas the Soviet Union, for months past, has invariably replied that it will agree to a ban on nuclear tests only as
part of an agreement for general and complete disarmament.
By insisting on this link between an issue which we had nearly
resolved and the difficult issue of disarmament, the Soviet Union
has tightened the knot and made it harder than ever to untie.
Only last Thursday the General Assembly rejected the idea of
delaying a test ban treaty by calling once again, by a vote of
71 to 11, for the urgent resumption of negotiations to outlaw
nuclear tests.
So let me point out at once to the distinguished representative
of the Soviet Union that it is his country alone which insists on
making a genuine and effective test ban dependent on the achievement of general disarmament. And because it does so insist,
the Soviet Union, as we now move into the debate on general
and complete disarmament, becomes doubly answerable to world
opinion. The world will look to them in this debate to answer
not one but two burning que~tions: Do you or don't you want
disarmament ~ and-once again-Do you or don't you want an
end to nuclear weapons, in fact or just in rhetoric ~
And yet there is this much connection between the two subjects: The advance in weapons technology as a result of tests must
ultimately increase our common peril. It is a measure of the
tragic failure of all our efforts to reach disarmament agreements .
.A.nd it is a compelling challenge to my Government to try againto make a fresh start-to insist with the utmost urgency that the
weapons which have made war an obsolete institution be laid
aside quickly before others are forced in self-defense to carry
this insensate race yet another stage toward ultimate folly.
No doubt there are those who will ask how we can dare realistically to speak of disarmament today, when the winds of conflict
blow all about us. There are those who will ask whether this
is mere wishful thinking, whether this is more t.han escapism.
To that we would reply: Escapism, no; escape, yes. For man
must escape, not in wishful dreams but in hard reality. We must

16

escape from this spiral of fear, from the outmoded illusion that
lasting security for peoples can be found by balancing out the
wildly destructive power in the hands of their governments.
As President Kennedy said to the General Assembly on
September 25:
Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when
this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman, and child
Iives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of
threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation
or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they
abolish us.

President Kennedy informed the General Assembly then that
the United States has prepared a new set of proposals for general and complete disarmament. These proposals were circulated
subsequently to all members.
He also outlined my Government's conception of what is needed
to create a world without war. It is a view which embraces first
steps, subsequent steps, and the ultimate goal at the end of the
road. And it goes far beyond the technical steps in arms reduction. It requires the reservation of outer space for peaceful
uses. It includes international programs for economic and social
progress. And it insists especially upon the essential need to
build up the machinery of peace while we tear down the machinery of war-that these ill ust go hand in hand, that these, indeed,
must be but two parts of a single program.
For in a world without arms, military power would be taken
out of the hands of nations; but other forms of power would
remain-and mostly in the hands of the same states which are the
most powerful military states today.
Conflicting ideologies would still be with us.
Political struggles would still take place.
Social systems would still be subject to disruptive pressures
from within and without.
Economic strength would still be a factor in, and an instrument
of, national foreign policies.
And the world would still be the scene of peaceful transformations-for it cannot and should not remain static.
Let us be clear about all this: Disarmament alone will not
purify the human race of the last vestiges of greed, ambition, and
brutality, of false pride and the love of power. N or will it cleanse
every last national leader of the least impulse to international
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lawlessness. No sane and honest man can pretend to foresee such
a paradise on earth-even an earth without arms. But it would be
a safer earth, where the contest and conflict could be waged in
peace.
Clearly, then, disarmament will not usher in utopia. But it
will prevent the wanton wastage of life and the wholesale destruction of material resources. And it will free the energies of man
to 'e ngage in beneficent pursuits. How much could be done to
improve the conditions of man-his education, his health, his
nutrition, and his housing-if even a small portion of the funds
and the ingenuity of man now devoted to improving the art of
killing were transferred to improving the art of living!
Who would keep the peace in a disarmed world ~ How would
our disputes get settled when arms have been taken away ~
If we can answer these questions, we are much nearer to a solution of the problem of disarn1ament. For these questions open up
the unexplored ground between first steps toward disarmament
and the vision at the end of the road. And the vision of a world
free from war will remain a utopian illusion until means for keeping the peace lend it reality.
It therefore seems clear to me that the only way to general and
complete disarmament lies along two parallel paths which must
be traveled together. One leads to the absence of arms, the other
to the presence of adequate machinery for keeping the peace. As
we destroy an obsolete institution for the settlement of disputes,
we must create new institutions for the settlement of disputesand simultaneously.
Let me repeat for emphasis. We do not hold the vision of a
world without conflict. We do hold the vision of a world without
war-and this inevitably requires an alternative system for coping
with conflict. We cannot have one without the other. But if we
travel the two roads together, if we build as we destroy, we can
solve the technical problems of dismantling the vast apparatus of
war.

u.s.

Proposal for Disarmament

Let me come now to the United States proposals for dismantling
the towering and costly machinery of war.
To begin with, the United States emphatically embraces the
commitment to general and complete disarmament. We proclaim
the goal-without reservation-and in the shortest possible span
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of time. And we take this ter.tnillology to mean exactly what it
says: the general and com J..'let~ disarmament of all national forces
capable of international aggression and the safe disposal of all
their arms.
It is interesting to note that the conference of nonalined nations
which met in Belgrade in September of this year demonstrates
how widely shared our goal is. I quote their words:
The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of
this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of
armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be
achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, the United States proposal is, indeed, a "radic~l"
one.
It calls for large reductions of armaments even in the first
stages-both conventional and nuclear armaments.
It calls for an end to production of fissionable materials for
weapons purposes, and the transfer of such materials from existing stocks for nonweapons use.
The program call~ for a stop in the further development of in..
dependent national nuclear capabilities.
It calls for the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of
strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.
It calls for an end to the production of such delivery vehicles.
It calls for the abolition of chemical, biological, and radioactive
\veapons.
In short, the United States program calls for the total elimination of national capacity to make international war. And, to
insure that all these steps are actually carried out by each side,
every step o! the way, the plan calls for the creation of an International Disarmament Organization within the famework of the
United Nations.
If the United States program is comprehensive, it also is flexible. It does not pretend to be the final word-nor would we
wish it to be. We expect it to be examined exhaustively, to be
altered and to be improved. It certainly is not perfect; but it
can stand up to close scrutiny, for it has been prepared at great
pains and in good faith. It is presented in dead earnest and in
the conviction that propaganda on the subject of disarmament is
a cynical and cruel mockery of man's deepest hope.
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Need for Adequate Verificati(;tl
At one point and one point alone the U nited States is, and will
remain, inflexible: This is on the familiar question of verification,
on the indispensable need for the world to know that disarmament
agreements are, in fact, being carried out. Because of the confusion that persists on this point, I must dwell upon it for a
moment.
First of all, verification must be understood not as a technical
point but as a fundamental principle-as the essential condition
for any significant progress in disarmament-as its sine qua non.
To pretend that there is enough confidence between the major
armed powers to accept disarmament without verification is to
deny the existence of the arms race itself. For the arms race is
nothing if not living proof of the absence of mutual trust, and
confidence has been rudely shaken by recent events.
I will say quite bluntly that mistrust exists on our side, and
how could it be otherwise ~ The hostility of Soviet leaders toward
my country, its institutions, and its way of life is proclaimed,
documented, and demonstrated in a thousand ways. Yet we
earnestly seek agreement with them-through diplomatic methods
and through agreements . recorded in words and deeds. So we
may be excused, it seems to me, if we are wary of agreements
deeply involving our national security with a nation whose recent
leader wrote this: "Good words are a mask for the concealment
of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry
water or iron wood."
These are the words of the late Marshal Stalin. I am aware
that his former absolute authority has been subject to a certain
reevaluation recently. But the present Premier of the Soviet
Union, who served Stalin so loyally, still proclaims his indebtedness to Lenin. And after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Lenin said
this:
We must demobilize the army as quickly as possible, because it is a sick
organ; meanwhile we will assist the Finnish Revolution. Yes, of course
we are viola ting the Treaty; we have violated it thirty or forty times.

More recently we have seen wholesale violation of agreements
pledging self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europenot to mention so contemporary an event as the erection of a wall
through the middle of a city in violation of a postwar agreement.
Mr. Chairman, I do not mention these matters to belabor the
dead, nor to rub salt in wounds both old and fresh, nor to becloud
the disarmament problem with irrelevant questions. They are
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not irrelevant, because there can be no disarmament without agreement and because clear warnings and harsh experience have
taught us to insist upon independent and international verification of agreements with the Soviet Union.
Our deepest hope--our most fervent prayer-is for proof that
this acquired lack of trust will no longer be justified. Meanwhile
we do not ask that those who are suspicious of us take ·us at our
word. We offer to them the same guarantees that we have the
right and duty to demand of them. We offer to submit to verification procedures under international control at each step of
disarmament.
Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the United States
has no interest in controls for the sake of controls. We do not
wish to buy control or to trade something for it. We have no
stake in playing the host to teams of foreign inspectors within
our borders. But there is no other way to dispel mistrust, to
exorcise suspicion, to begin to build the mutual confidence upon
which peaceful cooperation ultimately depends.
So we accept the need for adequate verification procedures. We
recognize the right of others to assure themselves that we in fact
do what we say we shall do with respect to disarmameJ?t.
But in the meantime we must find a · basis for workable
agreement.
Last spring, as delegates here will recall, this committee
agreed to postpone further discussion of disarmament so that
the United States and the Soviet Union could exchange views "on
questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body whose composition is to be agreed
upon."
Beginning on June 19 and ending on September 19, meeting
in Moscow, Washington, and New York, representatives of the
Soviet Union and the United States discussed these two questions.
The results of these talks were reported to the General Assembly
by the United States and the Soviet Union in a Joint Statement
of Agreed Principles, which is before· this committee, document
A/4879.
This report shows that, although our conversations did not
bring complete success, neither did they bring complete failure.
We were unable to agree on a forum for negotiations. But we
did agree on a set of principles to guide negotiations on
disarmament.
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The U.S. Government welcomed this limited agreement with
some hope, especially since the Soviet and American delegates
agreed quite explicitly to the implementation of all disan11ament
measures, from beginning to end, under international control.
This looked like a very bright spot on a dark horizon-perhaps
a real breakthrough to\\:" ard a world without an11S.
But, Mr. Chairman, our hopes have been restrained by the Soviet
refusal to follow through on this aspect of the agreed principles.
In his address to the plenary n1eeting of the General Assembly
on September 26, Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
A. Gromyko] made the following statement:
After all, no one knows right now what armaments and armed forces
the states possess. This is quite normal. For perfectly obvious reasons
states do not reveal that kind of information and the same situation will
endure after the implementation of disarmament measures provided for
in this or that state, pending the completion of general and complete
disarmament.

What can this possibly mean ~ The meaning is that to our
Soviet colleagues inspection should apply to the destruction of
armaments-but not to existing armaments or the production of
new ones.
Apparently we are being asked to establish an elaborate international inspection force simply to witness the destruction of
certain quantities and categories of arms, with no know ledge of
what remains-to watch while one weapon is junked without seeing whether two others are in production to take its place, perhaps
in reality to certify the disposal of inventories of obsolete equipment. I am reminded of the story of the little boy who was
showing off his conjuring tricks and said to his parents: "I am
going to do some magic for you, but you have to promise not to
look."
The Soviet position thus seems to be the same as it was when
the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, addressed a
letter to the U.S. disarmament representative, Mr. [John J.] McCloy, on September 21, at the conclusion of the bilateral SovietAmerican disarmament negotiations. Mr. McCloy had noted that
the Soviet Union had refused to accept, in the Statement of Agreed
Principles, a clause reading
Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not
exceed agreed levels at any stage.

Now, Mr. President, this sentence seemed to us to represent a
sine qua non for any effect ive verification and control. But in his
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reply Mr. Zorin insisted that such control-that is, control over
the armed forces and armaments retained by states at any given
stage of disarmament--would turn into what he called an international system of recognized espionage.
If it is the position of the Soviet Union that verification of
agreed levels of armaments retained by states under a disarmament plan is espionage, then clearly there can be no general and
complete disarmament agreement, for armaments destroyed are of
less concern to us than armaments retained. It is the latter and
not the former which states attacked in war would have to fear.
No matter how many weapons were destroyed, it would be the
weapons which were left that would be utilized in a military
operation. This is a stumbling block which could be crucial. Unless we can get a clear and satisfactory agreement on this particular point, it is difficult to envisage very substantial progress in
disarmament negotiations.
For under the Soviet concept of disarmament inspection, the
arms race could continue and the arsenals of war could be larger
and deadlier at the end of the first stage of "disarmament" than at
the beginning. In short, we would disarm in public and be perfectly free to rearm in secret.
Mr. Chairman, this interpretation turns common sense on its
head and makes mockery of logic. This turns reason into gibberish, meaning into nonsense, words into water.
The purpose of disarmament is to abolish war precisely by
abolishing the means of making war-which is to say, the armaments and armed forces with which wars are fought. If disarmament does not mean the reduction of the actual levels of
armament, it has no meaning at all.
I can only hope that Soviet delegates will not persist in their
attitude. If I have misunderstood the position I shall be happy
to be informed, and we can go forward. For on their face the
principles agreed between the United States and the U.S.S.R. do
provide sound and workable guidelines for serious disarmament
negotiations, and I prefer to think that they represent an important step in the right direction.

Question of the Proper Forum
This brings us to the question of the proper forum. During our
exchanges with the Soviet Union on this point we of the United
States tried to reach agreement on a formula which could then

23

be recommended to the other states concerned. Our position on
the exact representation was and still is flexible. These proposals
can be found in document A/4880. In fact we suggested four
possible alternative solutions, but to no avail. The Soviet Union
continued to insist on a formula which we felt ,vas restrictive and
based on artificial and arbitrary criteria.
Quite frankly, we have grown a little weary of the repeated
Soviet demands for changes in the negotiating forum on disarmament. The history of the disarmament talks is full of them. The
Ten-Nation Committee was established at Soviet insistence. This
was because they seemed to set great store by what they called
"parity" in numbers of delegations between their side and the
West-even though on the Western side there are several major
powers and on their side there has been only one. Then when the
Soviets found that the negotiations in the Ten -Nation Committee
were not to their liking, they abruptly broke off the talks and de~
manded an entirely new forum.
Now the latest Soviet proposal for altering the forum into
three "groups" is all too reminiscent of the Soviet view, which is
quite extraneous to disarmament and quite unacceptable to many
other nations: the view that the world can be neatly divided into
three so-called "blocs."
The United States recognizes that all nations have a vital stake
in the cause of peace and disarmament. On that basis we supported in past years the expansion of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to include all members of the United Nations.
We recognize, in fact, that the world outside the old Ten-Nation
Committee is much larger and more populous than the countries
represented in that Committee. Therefore, if we do expand its
membership, we would be inclined to include additional nlembers
to insure the representation and the advice of the world at large.
This is the sense of our proposal to add 10 members to the TenNation Committee which was carrying on disarmament negotiations in 1960, on the basis of equitable geographic distribution.
We hope the Soviet Union is ready to discuss with us the composition of the negotiating forum. I am sure most of the members of the committee would welcome an agreement on this point
which, would enable us to get started on the substantive negotiations which have been interrupted ever since the U.S.S.R. decided
it did not like the 10-nation forum it had demanded. The world
wants disarmament, and so do we, and not everlasting negotiations
about the number of negotiators.

24

While we consider the first moves toward disarmament, ,ve can
begin right away to strengthen our machinery for . keeping the
peace. We can do this without hampering our efforts to reach
agreement on disarmament. Every step to improve the machinery of peace will make it easier to take the next step in destroying
the machinery of war.
We need not even be at a loss as to where to begin or how to
proceed. The experience of the United Nations itself gives us
a starting point and a guideline. In its earliest years the United
Nations had successful experience with mediation and conciliation. It defended collective security and the independence of
small nations against their assailants in Korea. Then, at a time
of urgent need in the Middle East, the United Nations acquired
an effective po,ver to police the lines of an armistice agreement.
At another time of great need-in the Congo-it added an effective power to use force, if necessary, to restore order and to prevent a civil war. Out of such emergencies, the United Nations
is becoming a stronger instrument for keeping the peace.
It will have to be much stronger still. Our task now is to
strengthen, refine, and develop more fully the peacekeeping structure of the United Nations.
e can begin by drawing lessons from the United Nations'
most recent experience in the Congo. From this operation it is
not difficult to see that effectiveness in such peacemaking missions
depends in large measure on four things: first, the ready availability and mobility of national units; second, their discipline
and training and capacity to work with contingents of other
nationalities; third, the length of their commitment; and, fourth,
a clear chain of command flowing from United Nations
Headquarters.

';V

Improving U.N. Peacekeeping Machinery
When the United Nations is so often pitted in a race against
time, we risk a dangerous vacuum during the interval while
military forces are being assembled. And we further risk a
dangerous erosion in the political and moral authority of the
United Nations if troops trained for national forces are thrust
without special training into situations unique to the purposes
and methods of the United Nations, or if such troops are either
kept on the job without rotation, are precipitately withdrawn
when no replacements are at hand, or are insufficiently supported
for lack of adequate financial resources.
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"Ve are all deeply in the debt of those officers and men who
have served and are serving the cause of peace under the United
Nations flag. 'Ve must proceed without delay to strengthen the
context in which they act in this pioneering work of the United
Nations as the guardian of peace.
The United States has suggested that all nations .indicate the
kind and quality of military units they might be prepared to send
for service with the United Nations. My own country has provided very important logistic support for both UNEF [U.N.
Emergency Force] in the Middle East and the United Nations
Forces in the Congo. We now suggest that member countries
make available to the United Nations an inventory of the forces,
equipment, and logistic support which they would be prepared
to put at the disposal of the United Nations for peace-preserving
functions.
But to commit such facilities on paper is not enough. The
functions of a United Nations Force are likely to be different
from those of national forces. The United States believes that
national units should be specially trained for the special character of United Nations operations. Recent United Nations experience should be studied so manuals can be prepared to assist the
United Nations in officer training and to help member countries
in training noncommissioned personnel.
Such steps would strengthen the United Nations' capacity to
serve as an international police force. But a stronger and better
organized police force would be needed only when threats to
peace have reached dangerous proportions. The police force,
therefore, must be supplemented with improved machinery for
settling disputes before they reach an explosive stage. Our task,
here again, is to build on the existing resources of the United
Nations, including the International Court of Justice, and to avail
ourselves more fully of the potentials for action within these
existing resources.
The Secretary-General may wish to present to the United
Nations members his own ideas for the expansion and improvement of United Nations machinery for observation, factfinding,
conciliation, mediation, and adjudication. He undoubtedly will
wish to make use of senior members of his staff in his conciliation
activities. The political organs themselves may wish on occasion
to avail themselves of the services of rapporteurs.
Moves such as these-and I hope other members will have other
suggestions-would permit us to get on with the job of creating
the kind of peacekeeping machinery that will be essential for
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dealing with conflicts in a world free from war. And we can
start them at once-even without waiting for agreement on
disarmament.

Taking the First Steps
Every such move will help to reduce danger, help to lower
distrust, help to blunt fear. The way to start is to start; and
a good place to start is ready to hand. I refer to the proposed
treaty whose objective it is to outlaw further testing of atomic
devices in space, in the atmosphere, on the ground, or under
the ground or the water, which is still tabled at Geneva. We
are flexible about first steps; we are adamant only on the point
that we begin at once-immediately-to disarm.
lfr. Chairman, we can begin at once to disarm. To start now
in no sense limits or postpones the goal of general and complete
disarmament; indeed, this is the way to reach it faster. For
some steps can be taken sooner than others, without disadvantage to any nation or groups of nations.
Let no one doubt our seriousness. Six weeks ago the President
of our nation presented in person to this session of the General
Assembly the boldest and most comprehensive plan for disarmament that my nation has ever offered to the world. Since then
he has signed into a law an act creating a new Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, directly under his authority and containing an array of expert talent whose counterpart I would be very
happy to see in a similar agency in the Soviet Union.
Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, it is extremely difficult for
the mind to grasp a clear vision of a world without arms, for
it is a condition totally foreign to the human experience. But as
I also said earlier, it is even more difficult to envision a world
turned to a radioactive wasteland-which may well be the alternative. Difficult as it is, then, we must grasp the easier and
happier vision.
And I do think we can see, however dimly, the general outlines
of such a world. A world disarmed would not be utopia, but one
suddenly blessed by freedom from war. It would not usher in
world government, but the world community would have the capacity to keep the peace. It would not end national sovereignty,
but the sovereign right to commit national suicide would be yielded
up forever.
A disarmed world would still be a world of great diversity, in
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which no one nation could seriously pretend to have the wit and
wisdom to manage mankind.
It would be a world in which ideas, for the first time, could compete on their own merits without the possibility of their imposition
by force of arms.
It would be a world in which men could turn their talents tD an
agenda of progress and justice for all mankind i the second half
of the 20th century.
In short, it would not be a perfect world, but a world both safer
and more exhilarating for us all to live in.
There is nothing inherently inlpossible in creating the conditions for a world without war. Our basic problems are not technical, mechanistic, or administrative. The basic question is whether
every nation will agree to abandon the means to coerce others by
force.
If they will not, the arms race will go on. For those who love
freedom and have the power to defend it will not be coerced. .And,
uncertain as it is, free people prefer to live on borrowed time than
to yield to terror.
Conceivably the world could survive on this perpetual brink of
universal disaster. Conceivably fortune would spare us from the
fatal act of a lunatic, the miscalculation of an uninformed leader,
the false step of a nervous young sentry.
But on behalf of my Government and my people I propose that
this Assembly set the world on the road toward freedom fronl
war. .And I propose that this committee take the first steps by
approving a negotiating forum, endorsing the statement of agreed
principles already worked out by the United States and the Soviet
Union, and recommending that the new forum get on at once
with the first business of this dangerous world-general and complete disarmament.
I ask Mr. Zorin whether his country cannot so conduct negotiations now that we and our respective allies may be able to turn to
the rest of the members here, and to the hundreds of millions for
whom they speak, and say: "We have not failed you."
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u.s. Outlines Initial Proposals of Program
for General and Complete Disarmament
BY

DEAN RUSK

h.appy t.o ?ave the oppo~t~ity to meet in this hall with ~he
foreIgn mInIsters and prIncIpal delegates of the countrIes
participating in this conference. I bring you greetings from the
President of the United States and the most sincere good wishes of
the American people for the success of our work. I should like to
open my remarks by reading a letter which the President has sent
to me:

I

AM

As you and your colleagues from every quarter of the globe enter upon
the work of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, it may seem unnecessary
to state again that the hopes and indeed the very prospects of mankind are
involved .in the undertaking in which you are engaged. And yet the fact
that the immediate and practical Significance of the task that has
brought you together has come to be so fully realized by the peoples
of the world is one of the crucial developments of our time. For men now
know that amassing of destructive power does not beget security; they know
that polemics do not bring peace. Men's minds, men's hearts, and men's
spiritual aspirations alike demand no less than a reversal of the course of
recent history-a replacement of ever-growing stockpiles of destruction by
ever-growing opportunities fo'r human achievement. It is your task as representative of the United States to join with your colleagues in a supreme
effort toward that end.
This task, the foremost item on the agenda of humanity, is not a quick
or easy one. It must be approached both boldl~ and responsibly. It is a
task whose magnitude and urgency justifies our bringing to bear upon it the
highest resources of creative statesmanship the international community
has to offer, for it is the future of the community of mankind that is involved. We must pledge ourselves at the outset to an unceasing effort to
continue until the job is done. 'Ve must not be discouraged by initial disagreements nor weakened in our resolve by the tensions that surround us
and add difikulties to our task. For verifiable disarmament arrangements
are not a fair weather phenomenon. A sea wall is not needed when the seas
are calm. Sound disarmament agreements, deeply rooted in mankind's
mutual interest in survival, must serve as a bulwark against the tidal waves
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of war and its destructiveness. Let no one, then, say that we cannot arrive
at such agreements in troubled times, for it is then their need is greatest.
My earnest hope is that no effort will be spared to define areas of agreement on all of the three important levels to which Prime Minister
Macmillan and I referred in our joint letter of February 7 to Premier
Khrushchev. Building upon the principles already agreed, I hope that you
will quickly be able to report agreement on an outline defining the overall
shape of a program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful
world. I have submitted such an outline on behalf of the U.S. to the
U.N. General Assembly last September. But an outline is not enough.
You should seek as well, as areas of agreement emerge, a definition in
specific terms of measures set forth in the outline. The objective should
be to define in treaty terms the widest area of agreement that can be
implemented at the earliest possible time while still continuing your maximum efforts to achieve agreement on those other aspects which present
more difficulty. As a third specific objective you should seek to isolate
and identify initial measures of disarmament which could, if put into
effect without delay, materially improve international security and the
prospects for further disarmament progress. In this category you should
seek as a matter of highest priority agreement on a safeguarded nuclear
test ban. At this juncture in history no single measure in the field of
disarmament would be more productive of concrete benefit in the alleviation
of tensions and the enhancement of prospects for greater progress.
Please convey, on my behalf and on behalf of the people of the United
States to the representatives of the nations assembled, our deep and abiding
support of the deliberations on which you are about to embark. I pledge
anew my personal and continuing interest in this work.

All of us will agree, I am sure, that this conference faces one
of the mo.st perplexing and urgent tasks on the agenda of man.
In this endeavo.r we welco.me o.ur asso.ciatio.n ,vith delegates from
co.untries which have · no.t previo.usly been intimately involved
with earlier nego.tiatio.ns o.n disarmament. The dreary history
o.f such nego.tiatio.ns sho.WS that we need their help and fresh
Po.ints o.f view. The presence o.f these delegatio.ns reminds us,
to.o., that arms races are no.t the exclusive co.ncern of the great
Po.wers. Co.untries situated in every regio.n of the world are
co.nfro.nted with their o.wn co.nflicts and tensio.ns, and so.me are
engaged in arms competitio.n.

Disarmament a Worldwide Responsibility
We are no.t here dealing so.lely with a single struggle in which
a few large states are engaged, with the rest o.f the wo.rld as
spectato.rs. Every state has a co.ntributio.n to. make in establishing the co.nditio.ns fo.r general disarmament in its o.wn way. Every
state has a resPo.nsibility to. strive fo.r a reductio.n o.f tensio.n,
and o.f arlnaments, in its own neighborho.o.d.
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This means that each of us will bear personal responsibility
for what we do here. Every speech and every act must n10ve
us toward our common objective. At the same tilne, everyone
of us brings to the search for disarmament a separate fund of
experience relevant to our problem. The United States, for example, has established a major new agency of government to
mobilize its skills and resources to seek out and study every useful
a pproach to arms reduction.
What is needed is immediate reduction and eventual elimination
of all the national armaments and anned forces required for
making war. What is required most urgently is to stop the nuclear arms race. All of us recognize that this moment is critical.
We are here because we share the conviction that the arms race
is dangerous and that every tool of statecraft must be used to end
it. As the President stated on March 2, the United States is convinced that, "in the long run, the only real security in this age of
nuclear peril rests not in armaments but in disarmament."
Modern weapons have a quality new to history. A single thermonuclear weapon today can carry the explosive power of all the
weapons of the last war. In the last ,var they ,vere delivered at
300 miles per hour; today they tra vel at almost 300 miles per
minute. Economic cost skyrockets through sophistication of design and by accelerating rates of obsolescence.
Our objective, therefore, is clear enough. We must eliminate the
instruments of destruction. We must prevent the outbreak of war
by accident or by design. We must create the conditions for a
secure and peaceful world. In so doing we can turn the momentum of science exclusively to peaceful purposes and we can
lift the burden of the arms race and thus increase our capacity to
raise living standards everywhere.
A group of experts meeting at the United Nations has just
issued an impressive report on the economic and social consequences of disarmament which should stimulate us in our work.
The experts, drawn from countries with the most diverse political
systems, were unanimously of the opinion that the problems of
transition connected with disarmament could be solved to the benefit of all countries and that disarmament would lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions. They characterized the achievement of general and complete disarman1ent
as an unqualified blessing to all mankind.
This is the spirit in which we in the United States would deal
with the economic readjustments required jf we should achieve
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broad and deep cuts in the level of armaments. The United States
is a nation with vast unfinished business. Disarmament would
permit us to get on with the job of building a better America and,
through expanded economic development activities, of building a
better world. The great promise of man's capacity should not be
frustrated by his inability to deal with war and implem'ents of
war. Man is an inventive being; surely we can turn our hands and
minds at long last to the task of the political inv~ntion we need
to repeal the law of the jungle.

Laying Basis for Disarmament
How can we move toward such disarmament ~
The American people bear arms through necessity, not by
choice. Emerging from World War II in a uniquely powerful
military position, the United States demobilized its armed strength
and made persistent efforts to place under international control the
use of atomic energy, then an American monopoly. The fact that
the story of the postwar period has forced increased defense efforts upon us is a most grievous disappointment. This disappointment teaches us that reduction of tensions must go hand in hand
with real progress in disarmament. We must, I believe, simultaneously work at both.
On the one hand, it is idle to expect that we can move very far
down the road toward disarmam'e nt if those who claim to want it
do not seek, as well, to relax tensions and create conditions of trust.
Confidence cannot be built on a footing of threats, polemics, and
disturbed relations. On the other hand, by reducing and finally
eliminating means of military intimidation we might 'render our
political crises less acutely dangerous and provide greater scope
for their settlement by peaceful means.
I would be less than candid if I did not point out the harmful
effect which deliberately stimulated crises can have on our work
here. In the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations published on September 20, 1961, the United
States and the Soviet Union affirmed that, "to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world
it is important that all States abide by existing international
agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes
by peaceful means." Yet we are confronted by crises which inevitably cast their shadows into this meeting room.
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The same can be said for the failure of our efforts, so hopefully
begun, to conclude an effective agreement for ending nuclear
weapon tests. There is an obvious lesson to be drawn from these
considerations. The lesson is that general and complete disarmament must be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective
arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter. For the rule and
spirit of law must prevail if the world is to be disarmed.
As we make progress in this conference, ,ve shall have to lay
increasing stress on this point. A disarmed world must be a lawabiding world in which a United Nations peace force can cope
with international breaches of the peace. In the words of the
joint statement: "Progress in disarmament should be accompanied
by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peac-e and
the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means."
Fortunately there is one sign which can give us hope that this
conference will in good time lay the foundation stones for a world
without war. For the first time a disarmament conference is
beginning its activities within an agreed framework-the joint
statement of agreed princi ples-which all our governments have
welcomed along with every other member of the United Nations.
The United States considers the joint statement as its point of
departure. Our objective is to build on tha;t foundation and to
give practical application to the principles.
The United States program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, introduced in the United Nations
on September 25, 1961, was presented to give life to the agreed
principles. It is comprehensive in its scope and in its description of the-subjects suitable for action in the first and subsequent
stages of the disarmament process. It is framed so as to avoid
impairment of the security of any state. Ii aims at balanced and
verified disarmament in successive stages. It is not immutable,
however. It is designed to serve as a basis for negotiation.
This conference also has before it another plan, presented by
the Soviet Union. A comparison of the two plans will show some
areas of agreenlent. We believe it is the task of the conference
to search for broader areas of accord leading to specific steps
which all can take with confidence.
At this meeting the United States wishes to put forward some
suggestions and proposals regarding the course of our future
activity, first as to objective and procedure, then as to a program
of work for the conference.
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We believe that the ultimate objective should be the working
out in detail of a treaty or treaties putting into effect an agreed
program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful
world. To bring this about we propose that all of our delegations
agree to continue our efforts at this conference without interruptions, other than those we all agree to be desirable or necessary
for our task, until a total program for general and complete disarmament has been achieved.
As for procedures we propose that we find means of achieving
maximum informality and flexibility. We do not believe that
the best way to make progress is to concentrate our time and efforts
in protracted or sterile debate. Accordingly the United States
will propose that, as soon as ample opportunity has been allowed
for opening statements, the schedule of plenary meetings be reduced so that issues and problems can be explored in in formal
meetings and in subcommittees more likely to produce agreement.

u.s.

Proposals for Work of Conference

Let me turn now to proposals regarding the work for the
conference.
The first proposal is that the conference work out and agree
on an outline program of general and complete disarmament
which can be included in the report due to the United Nations
Disarmament Commission by June 1. The United States believes
that, to fulfill this first objective, the initial aim of the conference
should be to consolidate and expand the areas of agreement and
to reconcile the differences between the United States and Soviet
disarmament plans. This should result in working out a single
program of general and complete disarmament which all could
support. This agreed program might well take the form of a
joint declaration which could be presented to the United Nations
by all the states represented here. Such a program could be a
framework for the treaty or treaties which would put the agreed
total program into effect.
But of course our aims must be more ambitious than this. We
should begin at once to fill in the outline of the total program.
Wherever possible we should seek specific commitments that
could be put into effect without delay. This need not await agreement on the outline as a whole. Nor should it impede the development of an overall program. Wherever the common interest
permits we can and should put into effect defined, specific steps
as quickly as possible.
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As a first step toward filling in the details of such a program
the United States makes the following proposals:
ONE: We propose that a cut of 30 percent in nuclear delivery
vehicles and major conventional armaments be included in the
first stage of the disarmament program. We propose that strategic delivery vehicles be reduced not only in numbers but also
in destructive capability. We estimate that, given faithful cooperation, this reduction might be carried out in 3 years. Similar
reductions can, we believe, be achieved in each of the later stages.
It is recognized, however, that, in the words of the agreed principles, "All measures of general and complete disarmament should
be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty
could any State or group of States gain military advantage and
that security is ensured equally for all." But agreement on such
a reduction and the measures to carry it out would be a significant
step forward. It would reverse the upward spiral of the arms
race, replacing increases with decreases, and men could begin to
gain freedom from the fear of mass destruction from such
weapons.
Two: The United States has proposed that early in the first
stage further production of any fissionable material for nuclear
weapons use be stopp~d. We propose now that thereafter the
United States and the U.S.S.R. each agree to transfer in the first
stage 50,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 to nonweapons
purposes. Such a move would cut at the heart of nuclear weapons production. The initial transfers should be followed by additional transfers in the subsequent stages of the disarmament
program. Resources now devoted to military programs could
then be employed for purposes of peace.
THREE: The United States proposes that the disarmament pro·
gram also include early action on specific worldwide measures
which will reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation,
failure of communications, or surprise attack. These are measures which can be worked out rapidly. They are bound to increase confidence. They will reduce the likelihood of war.

We will be prepared to present concrete proposals for action
in the following areas:
A. Advance notification of military movements, such as major
transfers of forces, exercises and maneuvers, flights of aircraft,
as well as firing of missiles.
B. Establishment of observation posts at major ports, railway

35

centers, motor highways, river crossings, and airbases to report
on concentrations and movements of military forces.
C. Establishment of aerial inspection areas and the use of
mobil.e inspection teams to improve protection against surprise
attack.
D. Establishment of an International Commission on Measures To Reduce the Risk of War, charged with the task of
examining objectively the technical problems involved.
FOUR: The United States proposes that the participants in
this conference undertake an urgent search for mutually acceptable methods of guaranteeing the fulfillment of obligations for
arms reduction. We shall look with sympathy on any approach
which shows . promise of leading to progress without sacrificing
safety.
We must not be diverted from this search by shopworn efforts
to equate verification with espionage. Such an abortive attempt
misses the vital point in verification procedures. No government, large or small, could be expected to enter into disarmament arrangements under which their peoples might become
victims of the perfidy of others.
In other affairs, accounting and auditing systems are customarily installed so that the question of confidence need not arise.
Confidence grows out of know ledge; suspicion and fear are rooted
in ignorance. This has been true since the beginning of time.
Let me make this point clear: The United States does not ask
for inspection for inspection's sake. Inspection is for no purpose
other than assurance that commitments are fulfilled. The United
States will do what is necessary to assure others that it has fulfilled its commitments; we would find it difficult to understand
why others cannot do the same. We will settle for any reasonable arrangement which gives assurances commensurate with the
risks. We do not ask a degree of inspection out of line' with the
amount and kind of disarmament actually undertaken. Our aim
is prudent prec ution, in the interest of the security of us all,
and nothing else.
We are prepared jointly to explore various means through
which this could be done.. It might be possible in certain instances
to use sampling techniques in which verification could t.ake place
in some predetern1ined fashion, perhaps in specific geographic
areas, thus subjecting any violator of a disarmament agreement to
a restraining risk of exposure, without maintaining constant Bnrveillance everywhere. This is, I repeat, one example of ways in
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which recent progress in vel'lfication techniques can be adapted
to the needs of participating states. vVe would hope that this
conference would Inake a thorough study of every practicable
method of effective verification.
The four proposals I have just described are new and realistic
examples of the specific measures which we contemplated in t.he
first stage of the United States plan of September 25. We can
recall that that plan had other specific proposals:
That the Soviet Union and the United States reduce their force
levels by many hundreds of thousands of men, to a total of 2,100,000 for each.
That steps be taken to prevent states owning nuclear ,veapons
from relinquishing control of such weapons to any nation not
owning them.
That weapons c~pable of producing mass destruction should
not be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space.

Call for Early Action on Testing
we call for early action on a matter that should yield
priority to none-the cessation of nuclear ,veapons tests. Here
we stand at a turning point. If a treaty cannot be signed, and
signed quickly, to do away with nuclear weapon testing with
appropriate arrangements for detection and verification, there ",.ill
be further tests and the spiral of competition will continue upward. But if we can reach such an agreement, this development
can be stopped, and stopped forever. This is why the United
States and the United ICingdom have invited the Soviet Union
to resume negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons tests under
effective international controls. vVe shall press this matter here
at Geneva' and make every reasonable effort to conclude an agreement which can bring an end to testing.
I had expected that a number of rep'r esentatives might express
here their regrets that the Soviet Union and the United States
had resumed nuclear testing. But I had supposed that there was
one delegation-that of the Soviet Union-which could not have
found it possible to criticize the United States for doing so. 'The
representative of the Soviet Union has spoken of the possible
effect of United States weapons testing on this conference. The
statement of agreed principles and this conference were born alnid
the echoing roars of more than 40 Soviet nuclear explosions. A
50-megaton bomb does not make the noise of a cooing dove.
FINALLY,
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Despite the Soviet tests of last autumn, nuclear weapons testing
can stop-now and forever.
The Soviet Union has spoken of its readiness to accept inspection
of disarmament, though not of armament. We hope that it will
agree that the total, permanent elimination of nuclear testing is
disarmament and will accept effective international control within
its own formula.

Achieving Consensus on First Steps
I have presented the United States proposals for early disarmament action in this conference. We shall have further suggestions, and so, I am sure, will others. The conference will need
to single out those points it regards as most susceptible of useful
treatment, or most pressing in terms of the common danger, and
to take them up at once.
We believe that, as soon as agreement is reached on the specific
measures to be included in the first stage, we can develop the
specific steps for the second and third stages. In these stages
further reductions of armaments will move hand in hand with
the strengthening of international institutions for the maintenance
of peace.
Our plan of work must achieve what this conference is charged
to do in the joint statement of agreed principles. Let us define
the overall shape of the program. Let us develop in more detail
the component parts which must be fitted together within the
program. Let us do as much as we can as fast as we can.
Let us, then, apply ourselves to the task of this conference
soberly, systematically, and realistically. Let the need for disarmament provide the momentum for our work. Let us follo,v
every promising path which might lead to progress. Let us with
all deliberate speed reach a consensus on ,vhat can be done first
and on what should be undertaken on a continuing basis.
And let us not permit this conference, like its predecessors, to
become frozen in deadlock at the start of its deliberations. Surely
it need not do so. The obstacles to disarmament agreementsthe forces tending to divide us into rival aggregations of powermight at long last begin to yield to the overriding and shared
interest in survival which alone can unite us for peace.
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u.s. Urges Soviet Union To Join in
Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests
BY

DEAN RUSK

asked for the floor thib morning to comment on the interim report to which the chairlnan has just alluded. I do so
because of the expressed wishes of a considerable number of foreign ministers to turn their attention urgently to this problem of
the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests before the foreign
ministers begin to return to their respective capitals.
Let me say that the United States deeply regrets, in the words of
the brief interim report, that it is not possible to report progress
toward a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests,
because the United States regards and ,yin continue to regard a
safeguarded end to nuclear testing as a major objective of its foreign policy. It also regards this as a major problem for consideration by this conference.
The reason is obvious. 'rhe moratorium which for almost 3
years has halted nuclear weapon tests was wrecked by the sudden
resumption of testing by the Soviet Union last September. The
President of the United States has announced that the United
States will resume testing in the atInosphere late in April, if by
that time a safeguarded test ban treaty has not been signed. The
reasons for this decision were set forth in his speech of March 2,
which we are asking be circulated as a document of this conference.
The time is short, and this conference will understandably wish
to be sure that every possible effort is made to prevent a further
intensification of the race to produce more and more deadly weapons of mass destruction.
I have asked for the floor this morning to comment on the
interim report which the conference subcommittee on nuclear
weapons testing has made to the conference. Unfortunately that
interim report indicates that no progress has been made toward the
conclusion of an effective treaty to prohibit nuclear weapon tests.
The Soviet Union appears to be adanlantly opposed to any international system of detection and verification which could disclose
clandestine testing and thus serve to place an obstacle in the way
of a potential violator of a test ban treaty.
We hope we have not yet heard the last word of the Soviet
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Union on this matter, though I must confess that we see little
ground for op6misnl at the InOlnent.
Because of the United States Government's great desire to put
an end to all tests of nuclear weapons, we are ,villing to sign a
safeguarded treaty, with effective international controls, even
though the Soviet Union conducted over 40 tests last fall. However, we are willing to ignore these tests only if, in return, we can
be assured that testing will actually be halted. We will not again
make our security subject to an unenforcible and uncontrolled
moratorium, ,vhether this be in the fornl of a verbal pledge or a
pseudotreaty such as the U.S.S.R. proposed on N ovenlber 28, 1961.
What we need above all in this field is confidence and not fea.r,
a basis for trust and not for suspicion. To get this is the major
purpose of our insistence on effective international arrangements
to insure that nuclear weapon tests, once outla,ved, do not, in fact,
ever occur agam.
You will remember that the abnosphere for agreements on
disarmament questions was not too favorable in 1958, especially
after the collapse of lengthy negotiations in London during much
of 1957.
Accordingly, in the search for a more promising approach to
the issue of a nuclear test ban, the United States, the United
Kingdonl, and the Soviet Union decided to try to resolve the technical questions first before proceeding to a consideration of political questions. This path led to a conference in Geneva in July
and August 1958 among the scientists of eight countries, i.e. of
the three then existing nuclear powers plus France, Canada,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.
On August 21, 1958, these experts unanimously agreed on the
details of a control systeln which would be technically adequate
to monitor a treaty ending all tests of nuclear weapons. Before
SepteInber -I, 1958, the recommendations of the scientists had
been accepted in toto by the Governments of the United States,
the United ICingdom, and the Soviet Union. Essentially these
same technical provisions form the basis of the draft test ban
treaty presented by the United States and United Kingdom on
April 18, 1961.

Technical Aspects of Controlling Test Ban
I believe it would be helpful to review some of the technical
aspects of controlling a test ban.
The words "detection" and "identification" are the key to an
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understanding of the teclmical aspects of verification. A great
many methods have been devised by scientists to record the innun1erable happenings of a geophysical nature which take place
around us. Earthquakes are registered by seismographs; hydroacoustic apparatus records sounds in the oceans.
I have mentioned these two particular types of instruments
because they, along with various other devices, also happen to
be capable of registering signals which are emitted by nuclear
detonations. What we call detection is merely the capturing of
these diverse signals.
Detection, however, is only half of the story; in fact, it is rather
less than half. The primary concern is to know exactly what
has been recorded or detected. For example, the signal received
on a seismograph from an underground nuclear explosion looks
like the signals received on a seismograph from many types of
earthquakes. Signals which may come from a small nuclear detonation in the atmosphere may be difficult to detect. In each case
the overwhelming difficulty confronting any control system monitoring a nuclear test ban is how to differentiate among the various recordings or detected signals, how to tell which is a natural
phenomenon and which is a nuclear explosion.
This was exactly the issue that faced the scientists in Geneva
in mid-1958. It is the very same issue that faces us on control
today. The answer of the scientists was that, where doubt existed,
the only way to clear up the mystery was to utilize some form
of on-site inspection. This is still the only answer available to us.
In regard to underground tests, except for quite large ones like
the Soviet blast of February 2, 1962, the technical situation is
unchallenged by anybody and was even readily admitted by the
Soviet Government on November 28 last when it put forward its
new test ban scheme based on existing monitoring systems. For
these underground events which are detected but which cannot
be identified by expert interpretation of the seismic recording,
the only way to determine what has happened is to send an investigating team to the spot. The events could be earthquakes or
secret nuclear tests. And there could be some hundreds of such
events per year in the United States and the Soviet Union.
There is no scientific method not involving inspection that can
identify positively a seismic event as a nuclear explosion. If our
Soviet colleagues have reason to believe otherwise, they should
come forward with their new scientific evidence.
This technical situation provides a further important reason
for including the Soviet Union in the worldwide control-post
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network. The spacing between the control posts in the Soviet
Union should be exactly the same as it is in the rest of the world.
In order to have the best chance to eliminate a seismic event
from suspicion without conducting an inspection, that is, by means
of the interpretation of the seismic recording itself by experts,
it is essential to have readings from control posts on a global
basis, including those within the United States and the U.S.S.R.
Without instruments in the U.S.S.R.-one-sixth of the landmass
of the globe-many more seismic events in that country become
SUSpICIOUS.

In connection ,vith atmospheric tests, the conclusive means for
identifying the true nature of a detected event is to acquire a
sample of the air near that event. If the event was manmade
this will show up during a chemical analysis of the air sample.
For medium and large atmospheric nuclear detonations, the radioactive debris will become part of air masses that are certain to
move beyond the boundaries of the country concerned. This
method is not reliable, however, for small atmospheric tests.
In recognition of this the 1958 scientists recommended the installation of air-sampling equipment at every control post. Even
then they anticipated that in certain instances some question of
identification would still remain, and for this they proposed the
use of special aircraft flights conducted over the territory of a
specific country to capture air samples. Naturally, to the extent
that control posts within a country did not exist where radioactive air sampling could take place, there would be just that
much greater need of special air-sampling flights.
Although American scientists have for the past several years
been actively seeking new methods of detection and, even more,
of identification of possible nuclear explosions, and although there
are some promising avenues of investigation which may be proven
in the next few years, the fact is that very little has ·been discovered up to date to justify any significant modification of the
conclusions and recommendations of the Geneva scientists of
1958. Soviet scientists essentially agreed with this at our last
joint meeting with them on a test ban during May 1960 in Geneva.
Therefore, when we contemplate the cessation of nuclear weapon
tests by international agreement, we must still look to international
control arrangements similar to those proposed in 1958 to give
the world security against violations. But the faster we have
tried to move toward the Soyiets in these matters, the faster they
seem to move away from their earlier positions.
The draft treaty which the United States and the United I(ing-
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dom proposed in April 1961 reflected the recommendations of the
1958 experts. It also incorporated into its terms a large number
of politIcal and organizational arrangements for the test ban control organization on which the three powers had already come to
agreement at the test ban conference or which went far toward
meeting previous Soviet demands. Eastern and vVestern nations
were to have equal numbers of seats on the Control Commission,
which also had places for nonalined nations, and there were detailed provisions for an equitable division by nationality of the
international staff, as the U.S.S.R: had sought. The fact that
many of the administrative and organizational provisions for
the future International Disarmament Organization, as set forth
in the Soviet document tabled here on March 15, are similar to the
provisions of the Anglo-American draft test ban treaty of last
year demonstrates that the Soviet Union can have no serious objection to large portions of our proposal.

No Basis for Fear of Espionage
Indeed, when all is said and done, the fundalnental Soviet complaint about the test ban control system to which it seemed to
agree in 1958, 1959, and 1960, and which its own scientists had
helped to devise, is that it would facilitate Western espionage
against the Soviet Union. But the facts are otherwise. The proposed system would not have any potential for any espionage
which would be meaningful in terms of present-day military
requirements.
The truth is that under the United States-United I(ingdom
draft treaty control posts in the U.S.S.R. would be iInmobile units
with fixed boundaries. No site could be chosen for a control post
in the U.S.S.R. without the specific consent of the Soviet Government. No foreign personnel on the staff of any control post would
have any official need to leave the boundaries of the post (except
when entering and leaving Soviet territory), and it would be up
to the Soviet authorities to decide whether such personnel should
be permitted to leave the post. Within the post one-third of the
technical staff and all of the auxiliary staff would be Soviet
nationals, nominated by the Soviet Government. In these circumstances surely nothing taking place at the post could remain unknown to the Soviet Government.
The situation concerning on-site inspection teams would be
equally devoid of espionage possibilities. The area to be inspected
would be predetermined on the basis of seismographic recordings.
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There would be no random selection of the geographic site. To
get to the site of the inspection the teams would have to use transport furnished by the Soviet Government. They could only carry
specified equipment related to their immediate job. Although
there would not be any Soviet national members of the inspection
team, half of the team would be nationals of nonalined countries
and the Soviet Government would be invited to assign as many
Soviet observers as it wished to verify the activities of the inspection team.
I should also stress that the size of the inspect able area would,
in any event, be limited to the territory within a radius of about
8 or, in some cases, 13 kilometers from the point, the so-called probable epicenter, where the unidentified seismic event was presumed
to have taken place. This radius would involve an inspectable
area of 200 or, in some cases, 500 square kilometers. The Soviet
Union has territory of over 21 million square kilometers. Therefore it can readily be seen that, even if there were 20 inspections
per year in the U.S.S.R. and even if each of these inspections
operated within a 500-square-kilometer area, less than onetwentieth of 1 percent of Soviet territory, i.e. less than one part
in 2,000, could ever be subject to inspection in anyone year.
Finally, no espionage would be feasible on the occasional special
air-sampling flights which might take place over Soviet ten-itory.
The plane and its crew would be Soviet, and Soviet Government
observers could be on board. The only foreigners would be two
staff technicians from the control organization \vho would manage
the equipment taking the air samples and who would insure that
the plane actually flew along the route previously prescribed.
I have recounted these matters in some detail because it is easy
to make generalized charges over and over again about the dangers
of espionage in a test ban control system.
It takes careful explanation to show why such charges are completely groundless, even though it stands to reason that the
U.S.S.R., which was just as sensitive about espionage in 1958 as
in 1961, would never have accepted such a control system in principle in 1958 if it had then believed that the system could have had
the slightest real espionage danger for the Soviet Union.
It should be clear now that the explanation for Soviet behavior
on the issue of a test ban must be sought elsewhere. There is no
rational basis for Soviet concern about misuse of the control system for espionage purposes. There is no scientific basis for the
Soviet desire to abandon the still indispensable control system

which was recommended by the scientists in 1958 and approved by
the governments of the then-existing nuclear powers. There is no
political basis for any of us to believe that a test ban is any less
urgent now than it was in 1958 or that the benefits which it would
bring in improving the international climate would be any less.

U.S.S.R. Urged To Review Position
My Government, therefore, is at a loss to understand the Soviet
position unless it be that the U.S.S.R. has decided that it is still
overwhelmingly important for it to be free to continue its nuclear
weapon tests. This was what the Soviet Government said last
September, when it referred to the tense international situation
as a justification for its test resumption, and it may be that the
U.S.S.R. feels a military need for another test series. If this is
the case, then it is true that the easiest way for the Soviet Union
to remain unhampered by a test ban treaty is to offer one which
contains no provisions whatsoever for effective control and which
the United States and United Kingdom could accept only at grave
risk to their national security and to that of the free world.
I cannot urge the Soviet Government too strongly to review
its position and to return to the previously agreed basis of negotiation, namely, the experts' recommendation of 1958. We ask
the Soviet Union to cease its attempts to have the international
community distort sound verification procedures to accommodate
one state which is obsessed by a passion for secrecy. We ca~l
upon the Soviet Union to enter into genuine negotiations in the
three-nation subcommittee set up by this Committee to consider
the test ban problem.
There is today an interim report of this subcommittee. Rut,
unfortunately, there are no grounds for encouragement. I should
like to comment briefly on the events of the past few weeks whieh
have led us to this point.

Recent U.S. Proposals To Achieve Test Ban
The President of the United States on March 2 stated in referring to our conference here that:
. . . we shall, in association with the United Kingdom, present once
again our proposals for a separate comprehensive treaty-with appropriate
arrangements for detection and verification-to halt permanently the testing
of all nuclear weapons, in every environment: in the air, in outer space,
under ground, or under water. New modifications will also be offered in
the light of new experience.
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In fulfillment of this pledge the United States presented to the
Soviet Union, first in an informal meeting on March 15 and this
week in the subcommittee, ne,v proposals of the kind indicated.
We have indicated clearly in both formal and informal discussions that the United States is prepared to grant a point to which
the Soviet Union has apparently attached great importance,
nalnely, to drop the 4.75-degree threshold and to make the treaty
from the outset complete in its coverage-banning from the beginning all tests in the atmosphere, outer space, underground, and
in the oceans. We will do this without increasing the number
of inspections or the number of control posts in the Soviet Union.
'Ve would seek, by common agreement, to allocate the quota of
inspections in such a way that most would be conducted in a few
areas of high seismicity and only a few would be allowable in
a large region in the heart of the Soviet Union, where there are
normally few seismic noises which would require investigation.
These moves have been made possible by increased experience
and increased scientific knowledge. But our experience has also
shown the need for provisions for safeguarding other states
against the consequences of preparations for testing. This would
consist, in large part, of periodic declarations on the parts of heads
of state that there will be no preparations for testing, and agreed
rights to inspect a certain number of tin1es per year equal numbers
of declared sites on each side.
Experience has also shown the need for provisions to shorten
the time spent before the beginning of the inspection process.
This would primarily be a question of the way the Preparatory
Commission functioned and agreement to cooperate in speeding
up, by all possible means, the establishment of detection facilities,
including temporary control posts.
The United States has made clear that it still stands by its
original treaty proposal of April 18, 1961, plus the amendments
proposed in 1961, and will sign that treaty. It has also made
clear that it is willing to negotiate along the lines I have described
to update the treaty if the Soviet Union prefers.
The response of the Soviet Union thus far has not given us any
hope. The Soviet delegation has told us that the U.S.S.R. will
not accept a treaty with or without the amendments we propose.
vVe are still confronted with the unmistakable reversal of the
Soviet position which took place a few months ago after the
Soviet Union had for 4 years asserted its willingness to accept a
controlled test ban agreement and after 17 articles and 2 important treaty annexes had been negotiated. The roadblock to

46

a cessation of tests is this reversal of the Soviet attitude. The
U.S.S.R. was prepared to accept controls before the recent test
series. Now, after 40 or more tests, it is not ready to do so. It
is difficult for us to understand the reason.
The problem cannot really be espionage. For over 2 years in
the test ban conference, as I have outlined in detail, we negotiated
arrangen1ents 'which would insure that the modest amount of
control and inspection contemplated could not be misused for
espionage purposes.
The problem also cannot be that the verification system is overly
burdensome. As I have said, the system which we worked out
was directly based on the estimate of the minimum technical requirements which was the product of an agreed analysis by Soviet
and Western scientists. The technical basis for this system has
never yet been challenged on scientific grounds by the Soviet
Union.
The U.S.S.R. now seems to be telling us that under existing
circumstances the idea of international verification is wholly unacceptable in any form whatsoever. It seems to be telling us that
verification is not even necessary-that it is an insult to request
it, even though this is a measure of disarmament. Unnecessary ~
Merely necessary to end nuclear testing. It seems to be telling us
that there can be no impartial investigation, even when there has
been a signal recorded from within the Soviet Union and when
it is impossible, without such an investigation, to ascertain whether
the cause of the signal was a phenon1enon of nature or a manmade nuclear explosion.
We recognize that there are risks in any disarmament measure
because no control system can give 100 percent certainty. But a
study of our draft treaty with our proposed modifications ,vill
indicate that the United States and United Kingdom have been
willing to accept a very considerable degree of risk. However,
we cannot move to a treaty which is based on no adequate controls
at all but solely on pure faith. We do not ask the Soviet Union
to trust the word of other nations, and other nations cannot be
asked to trust the Soviet Union's word on matters of such farreaching significance.
In President Kennedy's words of March 2, "We know enough
now about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an
uninspected moratorium." The same could equally be said about
an unverified treaty obligation such as the U.S.S.R. is now proposIng. We do not intend to be caught again as we were in the
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autumn of 1961, and there is no reason why we should have to be
caught again by a unilateral Soviet decision to resume nuclear
weapon tests. This is a risk to national and international security
which the United States cannot and will not take. A test ban,
or any disarmament measure, will be acceptable to us only when
it is accompanied by adequate measures of verification.

International Verification Essential
In summary the essential element on which we must insist is
that there be an objective international system for assuring that
the ban against testing is being complied with. This means that
there must be an international system for distinguishing between
natural and artificial events. The April 18 treaty provided for
such a system. Last week the U.S. and U.K. made some modifications of the proposed treaty in a way calculated to meet Soviet
objections. These proposed modifications were rejected almost
immediately by the Soviets on the grounds that international
verification was not necessary. This refusal to accept any form
of verification strikes very hard at our efforts .to guarantee the
world against resumption of nuclear tests. The key element in
the U.S. position is that there must be effective international verification of the obligations undertaken in any such treaty.
Let there be no misunderstanding in this Committee. A nuclear
test ban agreement can be signed in short order. There are no
hidden difficulties; there are no mysterious obstacles in the way.
No time-consuming negotiations need be required. The groundwork has all been laid. Only one element is missing: Soviet willingness to conclude an agreement.
The United States will consider any proposal which offers effective international verification, but the United States cannot settle
for anything less.
We urge the Soviet Union to reconsider its attitude and join
in putting an end to nuclear weapon testing-a total end, a permanentend.
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The Initiative for Peace
BY

I

WILLIAM C. FOSTER

especially pleased to be with you today and in a few rnoments you will learn why. My good friend, Dr. E. A. J.
Johnson, invited me to participate in this wide-ranging series of
lectures on "The United States in a Changing World Environment" last June 30. It is a great credit to his keen perception in
the area of foreign affairs that I am here today. At the time I
received his invitation, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was not yet born and, obviously, I was not its
director.
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was est.ablished
by an Act of Congress on Septelnber 26, 1961, and I had the
honor to be appointed its Director by President I(ennedy shortly
thereafter.
Since then, arms control and disarmament have occupied a
fairly conspicuous position in the field of U.S. foreign policy.
Certainly its ultimate objectives are ideally suited to the title of
this lecture series-"The United States in a Changing World
Environment. "
While talking to a gathering of college students recently, I
remarked about the need for some new timing systerns for arms
control and disarmament. I was groping for ,vords, and perhaps
I still am, but what I suggested was that we need new clocksfaster for technologies, slower for humanities.
For, of course, what we are really talking about when we
negotiate for arms control and, ultimately, arms elimination is
nothing less than a radical change in the political structure of
the world. The United States has proposed to the Soviet Union,
and indeed to all the countries participating in the disannament
talks in Geneva, an orderly, progressive, step-by-step reduction
in arms. . I will go into these proposals in .more detail in a
moment, but there is a point I wish to make now. It i"s simply
this: assuming that it is agreed to move down the road in these
stages in which dependence on national armies is gradually
eliminated and replaced with reliance on international agenciesthe International Court of Justice, for example-fundamental
and basic changes in the political structure of relationship between nations are certainly involved.
AM
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The question of moment is whether we can really face up to
such changes.
We are under immense compulsion to move toward disarmament, for we know that an arms race is a means to a terrible
end.
But, equally, we are under life or death compulsion to disarm
only in concert with others and without sacrifice of our security.

The Dilemma
This is the dilemma: the necessity to keep our defenses strong
in a world threatened by Messianic communisln and the necessity
to begin the dismantling of the world's towering war machinery.
To many, these twin needs are hopelessly contradictory. In this
conviction they embrace either one or the other of the two courses
of action. But the nature of the world today requires us to
respond to both of these needs simultaneously. To build national
policy on only one is to court disaster. But national policy conceived in response to both offers the most promising hope of
avoiding a catastrophic collision.
And if avoidance of collision looks difficult, let me say that in
my opinion it is even more difficult than it appears. Henry Wriston, a distinguished educator and thoughtful American, points
out that the charter of UNESCO declares that wars begin in
the hearts of men. However, as he says, many of the things for
which men have fought lie deep beneath the thought processes;
they are not rational at all. 'Vars actually begin not in the minds
of men but in their hearts, using "hearts" in the old-fashioned
or Biblical sense as meaning the passions, the will, the sundry
drives for which the psychoanalysts have such murky nomenclature.
After all, it was only-should I say only-Helen's beautiful
face that once launched a thousand ships.
The serious point is that it is not enough in our efforts at arms .
control and disarmament to rely on what is rational and reasonable; we must have an eye open also for what is irrational and
'Unreasonable. I will not belabor the points. In our reasonable
minds we know today Inankind has in vivid fact already invented
something pretty close to Herman Kahn's "Doomsday Machine."
I appreciate that I am before a sophisticated audience today.
Most of you have read the reports that one Polaris submarine
carries more explosive power than all the bombs dropped by
both sides during World War II, including the two atomic bomb~.
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Such statements are hard to accept ,vith a full conlprehension.
I myself have spent many years in this field-at the Pentagon
in two wars; as a member of special commissions examining what
modern wea pons can do, and also what they could do to our
civilian population; as an executive in industry engaged in designing and making advanced weapons; and now in my present
job of pondering how we can safely lay down the weapons. Despite this experience extending back over the better part of 20
years, I still find it hard to grasp fully that it is almost possible
now for us humans to press the total "destruct" button. Yet this
is the fact; the Russians know it. In our rational moments we
face up to it and agree to talk about putting some controls on the
button, even abolishing it. Don't, I plead with you, scoff at the
Geneva meetings or give way to a certain "what's the use" feeling.
For if you conclude that all efforts at arms control and disarmament are useless, you may find yourself accepting the fallacious belief that nuclear war is a practical solution to the
settlement of disputes and the attainment of international political objectives.
No responsible leader in any country of the world that I know
of today believes that nuclear war is the solution to anything,
except that it probably would solve a great many human problems
by dissolving the humans. It is, I agree, ironic that it is the
catastrophic nature of nuclear war rather than the improvement
of human relationships that provides us with the opportunity
and the utter necessity to choose peace or death, but such is the
fact.
Given that fact, what are e doing about it ~
The answer is that under the initiative of President Kennedy,
and with the authority of Congress, we in the U.S. have set up
the Agency of which I spoke, the United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. It represents the first time in human
history, as far as I can ascertain, that a government has set up
a full-fledged independent agency to devote its total efforts to
seeking a responsible reduction in arms and seeking ultinlate
disarmalnent. Obviously, such steps will never be taken by an
undefeated nation unless there is an accompanying reduction in
the danger, so we are, as .our enabling legislation states, "an agency
for peace."
Although there has been a great deal written, and more said,
about the general principles of arms reduction, it has remained
for our Agency actually to work up a detailed plan for ,vhat we
believe is a safe start. In doing this work we kept in mind the
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statements of the Russians so that our plan might, at least in
principle, take into account what they have in the past said they
wanted.
Our Agency came into being only last September. Our first
task was to seek out and bring onto our staff individuals especially
competent in the fields we needed to explore in developing a considered plan. For example, we obviously require scientific talents
that not only know the various and relative weapons on our
side and the Soviet side but who also enjoy an expertness in the
complicated field of detection and verification.
We needed experts in diplomacy, men who have dealt with
the Communists in strategic areas. We needed men who were
familiar with the Soviet economy and the pressures it is under.
In short, we needed intelligence and experience of the highest
order.
And we needed something more. We needed men of dedication. We needed men who so competently understood the facts
of life in the world of today that they were willing, indeed glad,
to open their minds to concepts and procedures never experimented with before. We needed practical idealists. We needed
men of the great tradition of Western civilization, which is to
say men of practical optimism, not pessimists. Not every man
is suited to be a "peace-monger." It requires a special type. I
have emphasized to t hose invited to join the Agency that if they
don't believe in the aims of our Agency, they will do everybody
a favor by not joining.
Now this doesn't mean that we looked for the starry -eyed. The
other day I was called up to the office of a certain Senator, and
there I was greeted by a group of indignant women. They did
not want us to put down one rifle until we were absolutely certain
that the Russians were doing likewise. They seemed a bit
startled when I told them I couldn't agree more. "Ve are not,
repeat not, interested in tmilateral disarmament. We are not
disciples of passive resistance.
What we do believe in was carefully stated in the proposals
we laid before the Disarmament Conference in Geneva on April
18. There are three principles:
1. Disarmament must be balanced so that no state gains a military advantage.
2. Compliance with disarmament obligations should be verified.
3. The United Nations should be progressively strengthened
so that it can enforce peaceful settlement of differences.
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Three Stages in Disarmament Plan
Under our plan, disarmament \vould proceed in three stages.
~fajor armaments would be reduced in three equal annual steps
of Stage I by 10 percent each, a total of 30 percent. Agreed arms
\vould be disposed of under the cognizance of a new U.N. agency,
the International Disarmament Organization. In the first half
of step one of Stage I, we might, for example, release some B-52's
while the Russians would deposit an equal number of Bisons
and Bears. In the second half of step one of this plan, the IDO
\vould destroy or convert to peaceful uses the deposited weapons.
The IDO \vould verify that the armaments were thus dealt with
and that retained arms did not eX'ceed the pre-agreed levels.
These steps would proceed in the same fashion throughout
Stage I.
Production of new items would be restricted and could only
be done at a rate such that remaining levels by numbers and by
some agreed measure of destructive capability would be lower.
In other words, the level would be reduced on a net basis during
each step of Stage I, but not necessarily in each type of weapon.
As to uniformed men, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would reduce
to 2.1 million each, and other major, or as we say "specified,"
countries would be limited to the same. Smaller countries would
be limited to 100,000 men or one percent of their population,
whichever was higher.
.
. Fissionable material production would be halted for weapons,
and agreed quantities would be transferred to peaceful uses.
These are some of the significant elements in Stage I of our
disarmament plan. Before speaking of the second stage, I think
it is important to note here the principles which we believe should
apply in making the transition from Stage I to Stage II and
from Stage II to Stage III. Because disarmament goes to the
very heart of a nation's security, I am certain I need not emphasize
how essential it is to proceed with care and deliberation. Stemming from this awareness is our belief that the transition from
one stage of the disarmament process to another must be a moment
of pause and consideration to insure that all disarmament actions
of the previous stage have in fact been carried out and that the
nations are ready to move into the next stage of the program.
This should not be taken. as an indication of any unwillingness
on the part of the United States to go the full length of the
road leading to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful
'vorld. But let us be honest enough to face the fact that it is
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totally unrealistic to agree to speed down this road 'w ithout slowing and even stopping periodically to be sure ,ve are still on the
right road.
Stage II-and I aln skipping very lightly over these-would
also be of 3 years' duration. Armed forces would be cut 50 percent below the Stage I levels. Nuclear weapons and nuclear
stockpiles would be further reduced by the saIne percentage..
Agreed military bases and facilities 'wherever the.y were located
would be disInantled or converted to peaceful uses in an agreed
sequence. The strengthening of peacekeeping arrangements begun in Stage I would continue. This would include acceptance
of the cOInpulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of J ustice, the establishment of the United Nations Peace Force, and
further strengthening of IDO to insure its ability to verify.
Stage III would be of 'lmdetermined duration-3 years, 5 years,
10 years, or more, but it would be the period in which the objective of what we in the trade call "G and C," meaning general
and complete disannament, ,vould become a fact.

Inspection and Verification
The questions usually put to me by Alnericans don't seem to
deal so much with broad principles as they do with details. For
example, I ,am sometimes asked, and often 'with a touch of horror
in the voice, ,,~hether we would start disarmament without prelinrJ.inary inspection or verification. The answer is that the
process of disarmament nlust be silnultaneous ,vith the procedure
of inspection. We do not seek inspection for its own sake. What
,ve ask is that a disarmament conlnlitment undertaken be guaranteled by more than a promise. Given the abyss of distrust which
divides the Communist and non-Communist worlds, "Te cannot be
expected to accept the "rord of the Soviet Union that they are, in
fact, following through on a pledge to destroy certain armanlents.
'rhe reverse of this is also true. We do not ask the Soviets to
accept our verbal pledge. "'\¥"e are prepared to subInit appropriate inspection of whatever disarmalnent measures are undertaken.
But there is another essential to this whole question of verification of disarmament commitments. It lies in the fact that it
is not the arms which are destroyed ,vhich we must fear-it is
the arms that remain or that are produced contrary to agreement
that pose the real danger. The Secretary of State has used the
phrase: "Secrecy and disarmament are incompatible." This gets
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to the very core of the verification probleln. We cannot place
the security of our country and the free w'orld at the 111ercy of
actions taken behind a curtain of secrecy. Thus a logical extension of the principle of adequate assurance that arms are, in
fact, being destroyed is the corollary that whatever residual
levels of annaments are agreed upon shall not be exceeded. Let
l11e use a simple illustration to make this point, for it is vital to
an understanding of the whole problem of verification.
Suppose you and your neighbor, after years of quarreling, have
each alnassed a rather fon11idable collection of pistols and swords
for protection should your disputes flare into violence. One day
you both decide that it is foolish to maintain such an expensive
hoard of firearms and cutlery and you both agree to destroy all
of the s,Yords and half of the pistols each possesses. The first
question that must be asked after such a verbal bargain is struck
is silnply this: How many swords and pistols does each of you
possess ? You may say you have 100 swords and 100 pistols.
Therefore, under the terms of your agreement you ,vould offer
up 100 swords and 50 pistols for destruction. But suppose your
neighbor doesn't believe you. Suppose he says: "I know you
have 200 swords and 100 pistols." Hovv is such a wrangle to be
settled? By claim and counterclail11? By verbal declarations
and denials? Of course not. The only way is for each party to
permit the other to verify by some forms of direct observation
or inspection that the declared total of swords and pistols is the
actual total. .Thus, when the verbal agreen1ent to destroy 100
swords and 50 pistols is made, the other party will know with
certainty that only 50 pistols actually remain-not 500 or 5,000.
I assure you that I have not digressed with this little story
of swords and pistols-however incongruous such examples may
seem when compared with rockets and missiles. The hard fact
of the n1atter is that this problem-the problem of verification
of rmnaining armalnents-is a very fundamental difference between the United States and the Soviet Union today. I am not
suggesting that the analogy I have offered is wholly applicable
to the problems of disarmament and inspection involving nation
states. But it does illustrate one of the fundamental elements
of the verification problem, and I 'would be less than candid if
I did not admit to you that it is a problem which must be solved
before we can hope to achieve Ineaningful disarmament progress.
The next question is almost always : "Now, as a practical n1an,
just 'what are the chances, do you think, for anything of this
sort? Aren't we 'wasting time and energy that might otherwise
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be used on arms production ~ Have we time for this frustrating
Geneva stuff~ Does anybody really think the Soviets want
disarmament? "
Well, those are core questions, certainly. I'm glad I prefaced
these remarks with the statement that, if we are to move down
this path, "fundamental and basic changes in the political s.truc·
ture of relationship between the nations are involved."

Pressures for Disarmament
But there are pressures building up behind disarmament. I
mention one in the fact that modern \var is so threatening to
human life that rational men cannot press the "destruct" button.
Another pressure is the lTIOunting costs of the arms race. This
is already affecting, and I think acutely affecting, the Russian
ability to produce sufficient food, to say nothing of consumer goods.
It is not a good, or safe, posture for a Russian Government to
be in the posture of denying sufficient food to its people. I, for
one, place emphasis on the probable increasing pressure \vithin
Russia for relief from the burden. Proposals such as we have
made, with their provision of safety and ,vorld participation,
will have their effect. They offer alternatives; they offer room
for negotiation. I believe they ,vill have their appeal and their
effect.
A final pressure, of course, is world opinion. In a nuclear war
there really can be no neutrals. The effects of nuclear war can
. be universal. Certainly today the dread is universal.
Witn~ss for yourselves the concern about resumption of nuclear
testing. And while the United States will always be responsive
to the pressures of world opinion, we cannot let it be the don1inant
factor in decisions affecting our national security. 'Ve have
resumed testing only with great reluctance and because we ,vere
forced .to do so by Russian refusal to abide by her promised
suspension. Her broken promise was evidenced by last fall's series
of tests. IIowever, this demand of the vlorld for an end to
testing will in time, I believe, have its effect and bring the Russians to tie realization that their o,Yn security and welfare can ·
only benefit from an end to the testing of nuclear weapons.
I would be less than candid if I did not confess SOlne disappointment with the course and pace of events at the Geneva
meetings thus far. The Soviet response to our detailed proposals
has not been as thoughtful as I had hope-d, but on the positive
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side they did raise son1e specific points. First, they objected to
the open end on time for completion of the third or final stage.
They also said it was unfair to ask them to give up certain longrange rockets while we still held bases that could reach them
from shorter range.
I won't attenlpt to pass judgment on such points here, but
the important fact is that we are all still in Geneva, talking
and negotiating over these and other points, and as the pressures
build, I believe-I fervently hope-we shall find ways of moving
together to reverse the arms race. At least I feel that we have
accomplished something to date, even if it is only to begin to
search out for discussion the ways and means of making a start.
This is acting as rational men should act, and while there is
reason, there is hope.
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The New Search for DisarmamentGeneva 1962
BY

ARTHUR H. DEAN

I am 'well acquainted with a. number of other parts
of Switzerland as a result of many trips to Geneva over
the years to take part in international negotiations, this is my
first visit to the thriving and charming city of Ziirich. It is particularly pleasant and auspicious that the occasion for this initial
encounter should be an invitation from your association, the
Swiss Friends of America, a societ.y which has endured for over
40 years.
The name of your group itself seenlS a most happy choice,
because it confirms the fact that, ,vhile Switzerland and its people
have nothing except friends in America, the reverse is reci procally true, I am sure, over here.
Indeed, if all nations enjoyed the excellent Hlutual relations
similar to those of the United States and Switzerland, our
disarmament conference in Geneva "'ould probably be unnecessary.
In any event, even if it 'were still necessary, it 'would be almost
sure to reach rapid agreement. Unfortunately, the mutual relations bet-ween some of the countries represented in our negotiations are not as good as Swiss-American relations, and this C0I11plicates our task in Geneva.
1Ve ealIDot, of course, overlook the fact that the 18-Nation
Disarnlalllent Conference is not proceeding in isolation fronl the
world but in the most intimate connection with it. Indeed, its
,vork is addressed to political, nlilitary, and psyehological problellls
,vhich are po,verful and acutely sensitive factors in the existing
international situation.
The proposals of the various participating nations impinge
directly on these sensitive factors, and the reaction by other menlbel'S of the 18-Nation Committee to such proposals is frequently
derived fronl the broader context of world affairs-from considerations of mistrust and suspicion, danger and risk, advantage
and disadvantage, as well as from hopes and ideals.
We know that the greatest concentration of military forces has
taken place in North America, Europe, and the Soviet Union.
The focal point for this concentration is, in many ,vays, Germany.

A
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Our conference cannot, therefore, forget the interrelationship
between the division of Gernlany generally, including the Berlin
crisis specifically, and the possibility of progress on disarlnament.
I do not wish to suggest either that disarmament is dependent
on a German settlement or that a German settlement must await
disarmament.
We have been negotiating and will continue to negotiate with
the Soviet Union quite separately on these two issues, as well as
other problems. However, we must recognize that disarmament
requires the cleveloplnent of at least limited amoun't s of trust
bet'ween East and 'Vest, and that the inlplementation of disarmalnent cannot proceed without a considerable degree of
cooperation.
In contrast to this, the growth of international tension which
accompanies such crises as the Soviet Union has manufactured
around Berlin makes the growth of East-West confidence and
collaboration much more difficult. Thus it is apparent that, even
without any formal link bet,veen international political problems
and disarmament, there is bound to be a connection between them
in the minds of the heads of government and foreign ministers
who direct national policies on all of these matters.
Having established this general framework in which our conference must carryon its deliberations, I should now like to leave
political problems to others and concentrate on disarnlament efforts
themselves.

The Objective at Geneva
Frankly, in spite of my daily preoccupation with the affairs
of our conference, I still remain in awe of the objective which
we have set before ourselves in Geneva. We are not primarily
discussing measures to calnl the international scene or to facilitate
partial disa.rlnalnent, a.lthough there is some of this. Our main
attention is directed tow'ard achieving the total disarmament of
all nations for all tinle, except for the retention of linlited internal
security forces inside each country and for the maintenance of
a United Nations Peace Force.
It staggers the imagination to think of great states without
armies, to contelnplate the abolition of nuclear weapons, delivery
vehicles for nuclear weapons, armaments, war budgets, weapons
factories, general staffs, and all military training. Yet our aim
in Geneva is to bring all of this to an end everywhere.
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Because this goal is so far-reaching, because it cuts so deeply
into the pattern of everyday human experience, great skepticism
exists, I know, about whether the 18-Nation Committee can really
be serious in its work. People inevitably ask whether we are not
all engaged in a tremendous propaganda show in which no one
expects significant progress but in which each side is trying to
blacken the reputation of the other.
I cannot, of course, speak for what other participating states
may believe or intend. But as far as the United States is concerned, we are at Geneva because we want to get on with the
job. We have carefully examined the great problems and difficulties of disarmament, but we have also thought long and hard
about the alternatives to disarmament. On this basis, in this
comparison, there cannot be any doubt about the preferable course.
Disarmament wins hands down.
We know-and we think that the Soviet Union agrees in thisth at armaments and the arms race cannot provide security in the
long run. They cannot lead to a healthy international atmosphere,
to a world free froIl).. fear and suspicion, to a planet devoting all
of its human and economic resources to the maximum development
of living standards everywhere.
.'
Indeed, if the armed forces of the 'world should ever be unleashed for a nuclear conflict, the .physical devastation and the
moral degradation of the human spirit would be without parallel
in history.
Our objective, therefore, is world sanity and enhanced national
security through disarmament. The present military and political
alliances of the United States are essential because they provide
us and our allies with a degree of security which we would
otherwise not have under existing international conditions, when
there is no disarmament. What we want to do is to move from
this situation of partial and imperfect security for civilization
and our way of life, which we hold dear, to the far more safe
and sound conditions which can be attained under general and
complete disarmament.
As we know all too well, this is easier to set forth as a goal
than to translate into a practical program for action. N evertheless, we are attempting to do just that in Geneva. Fortunately,
we did not begin our labors on March 14 without careful advance
preparation, and this should have a most important bearing
upon our chances for ultimate success.
The 18-Nation Conference is the first international meeting,
at least since the end of the Second World 1Var, which is ex-
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plicitly concerned with total disarmament. It has not been so

in the past. For example, one of the key questions at the 10Nation Disarmament Conference which met in Geneva for 4
months in 1960 was whether the objective should be defined as
total disarmament or partial disarmament. All previous conferences and United Nations meetings on disarmament frankly
addressed themselves"only to partial measures in limited fields.
Now this problem is settled.

Agreement on Principles
And, what is even more significant, bilateral negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union from June through
September 1961 produced an agreement on eight major principles
for general and complete disarmament. These principles define
the scope of disarmament, describe some of the procedures for
carrying out disarmament fairly and sensibly, acknowledge that
effective international control must accompany every disarmament step, and provide for the strengthening of mternational
peacekeeping machinery at the saIne time as disarmament proceeds.
The existence of these principles, which were approved unanimously last fall by the United Nations General Assembly, has
meant that the 18-Nation Conference was enabled to start immediately at a more advanced stage of work than would otherwise
have been possible. We have been given the framework or agenda
for the conference. Our job is to devise the all-important details.
It will be useful to list some of the chief subjects with which
we must now deal. First, we must work out a disarmament plan
which gets all nations from their present state of being 100
percent armed to a future state of being 100 percent disarmed
except for small internal security forces. The plan must include
measures that cover every aspect of abolishing the military
establishments of states. But it must define those measures and
work out their timing and sequence in such a way that no state
gains a military advantage over another state during the disarmament process.
Second, we must insure that whatever disarmament plan is
finally agreed on is carried out by all signatory states in the
prescribed manner and in the fixed time period. To do this, we
shall have to create an International Disarmament Organization
to verify what is actually taking place on the implementation of
disarmament measures in each country.
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We already know from past experience that substantial political and organizational problems will have to be faced in creating
this organization in such form that it can operate effectively and
impartially in all countries while still satisfying all states ·t hat it
will be a truly intern8ltional instrument and not predominantly
the agency of anyone group of states.
Besides this, on the technical and scientific level we also know
that there will be many practical difficulties in drawing up sound
control measures. It is, of course, not too hard to verify the
destruction of particular weapons or to confirm that some arms
factory has actually been shut down. . However, this does not
solve the problem of making certain ·th8lt weapons which should
have been destroyed have not been retained in secret and hidden.
It does not tell us how to arrange matters so that a factory which
produces rockets for space exploration purposes is not secretly
producing similar rockets for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The same difficulties of control exist in regard to the output of
factories producing fissionable materials for peaceful purposes,
such as the nuclear generation of electric power.

Maintaining Peace Without Armies
Third, we must devise practical measures for maintaining international peace and security when national armies are no
longer available to furnish the traditional basis of international
politics. This involves efforts on two fronts. Fir8t, strengthen
international machinery, which must be strengthened for settling
disputes by peaceful means, through the United Nations and
otherwise. Secondly, we must see to it that if any st3lte does
attack another, there will be in existence a sufficiently strong
international peace force under effective command to suppress
such a thre3lt to the peace.
Both the United States and Soviet Governments have addressed
themselves to these problems by means of relatively detailed
disarmament plans which their delegations have tabled in Geneva.
Many other details still remain to be filled in for each plan,
but, not surprisingly, major differences in content and approach
are already apparent, even though both nations have subscribed
to the same final disarmament objective.
The United States plan envisages three stages for achieving
total disarmament. The time periods for the first and second
stages are fixed at 3 years each, while the time period for the
third and last stage remains to be worked out during the course
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of the negotiations. Our program is thus for a period of 6
years, plus some as yet undetermined additional number of years.
The basic philosophy of the American proposal is: first, to halt
the arms race in its tracks by preventing a further upward spiral;
next, to begin squeezing down existing armament levels by balanced reductions all across the board; and, finally, to complete
the total liquidation of military establishments.
Throughout this process we provide for a gradual increase in
the degree to which each state will be subject to international
inspection and control.
We also envisage the expanded use of the Internatio:p.al Court
of Justice, a firmer adherence by all states to rules of peaceful
international conduct, and agreement on effective arrangements
for staffing, equipping, and using the new United Nations Peace
Force.
To give a few more details, the United States plan proposes
that the vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons, and all other
armaments except the nuclear weapons themselves, should be cut
30 percent in the first stage, 35 percent more in the second stage,
and eliminated entirely in the third stage.
The production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons
would be stopped in the first stage, half of the stockpiled weapons
themselves would be destroyed in the second stage, and the rest
in the third stage. The production of all other arms would be
severely limited in the first stage and ended at the start of the
second stage.
Armed forces would be cut to a level of 2,100,000 men each
for the Soviet Union and United States in the first stage, to
1,050,000 in the second stage, and to zero, except for small internal
security and U.N. Peace Force contingents, in the third. Similar
reductions in all of the foregoing categories would also have to
be applied to other militarily significant powers in the second
stage and to all states in the third stage.

The Soviet Plan
The Soviet plan also consists of three stages, but the total
time period for implementation is fixed at about 4 years.
The U.S.S.R. proposes that all vehicles for delivering nuclear
weapons and all foreign bases be liquidated in the first stage.
The production of such.delivery vehicles would cease. The armed
forces of the United States and Soviet Union would, at the same
time, be cut to 1,700,000 men, and conventional armaments would
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be reduced accordingly. Under the Soviet plan, nothing would be
done in the first stage in regard to the production of fissionable
material or nuclear weapons.
The second stage of the Soviet program envisages the total
elimination of nuclear weapons, a cut in armed forces to one
million men, further cuts in conventional armaments stockpiles,
and the cessation of 'a rmaments produ~tion by the end of the
second stage.
The third stage would see the total elimination of remaining
armaments and armed forces except for limited police contingents
to remain for internal security needs.
The Soviet plan envisages the application of control and verification procedures to what it calls measures of disarmament.
This means control over the specific arms destroyed, over the
particular men demobilized, and over the factories designated
to be closed down.
It apparently excludes control over agreed levels of retained
weapons and armed forces in stages one and two, as well as over
factories continuing production. It also does not appear to provide for inspection in a country to search out armaments which
may have been hidden in violation of the treaty, except, possibly,
until after the end of the third stage, when total disarmament
will have been achieved. In the meantime, the reduction in arms
would have to proceed in part on faith alone without verification
and inspection.
With regard to peacekeeping arrangements, the Soviet plan advocates reliance upon a somehow vaguely strengthened United
Nations but does not specify any other instrumentalities. The
eventual U.N. Peace Force, to come into being at the end of
stage three, would consist of agreed police contingents from various states operating under a troika-type command of Eastern,
Western, and neutral nation representatives and called into action
only by Security Council decision, on which, as you ·know, the
permanent members have the power of veto.
The current debates of the IS-Nation Conference are actually
directed at these two plans, which I have presented only in very
sketchy outline. .

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Differences
Each side is finding that there is much to criticize and to study
in the plan of the other.
The Soviet delegation says that the United States plan is to

be stretched out over too long a period, the end of which has not
yet been fixed. The U.S.S.R. claims that the 30 percent American
cut in most armaments in the first stage is grossly inadequate
and will not eliminate the threat of nuclear war to the same extent
as the Soviet first stage cut of 100 percent in nuclear delivery
vehicles.
The Soviet. delegation is very critical of the absence of any
reference to the reduction of foreign military bases in the first
stage of the U.S. program.
Moreover, the U.S. is said to be demanding too much control
over the Soviet Union at too early a stage in the disarmament
process, especially the right to verify Soviet adherence to agreed
levels of forces and armaments and the right to search Soviet
territory for hidden weapons.
Amb~sador Zorin of the Soviet Union has also criticized the
proposed American force cut to 2,100,000 men in the first stage,
as against the Soviet proposal for a cut which would go 400,000
men deeper.
For its part, the United States believes that the Soviet scheme
for a total elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage, accompanied by the liquidation of all foreign bases, would cause a
grave strategic imbalance in the world, which the more gradual
across-the-board reductions of the American plan would avoid.
We feel that the Soviet plan is most imprecise about the nature
of the cuts in conventional armaments and in their production
in the first and second stages. We are disturbed by a lack of
Soviet willingness to join with us in first stage studies of control
measures for complicated stage two and three measures to liquidate
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We are also convinced
that 4 years is too short a period for carrying out general and
complete disarmament jn view of the great international changes
which will accompany such disarmament.
The United States also feels that the Soviet plan does not
come to grips with control and inspection problems. It seems to
us that, behind Soviet claims that broader inspection measures
would mean Western espionage inside the U.S.S.R., there is an unwillingness to recognize that extensive controls are necessary to
substitute for nonexistent confidence between East and West that
either side will honestly fulfill its disarmament obligations.
Finally, we do not go along with the Soviet concept that the
eventual United Nations Peace Force will consist of only police
contingents, will operate under a three-bloc type command, which
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would require unanimity in -the issuance of commands, and will be
usable only if no permanent member of the Security Council
vetoes its employment.
As of this time, our debates in Geneva are continuing on
all of these points, and on many more. Noone can now foresee
what the outcome will be. Quite clearly, agreement will be
possible only if we can iron out the fundamental differences
between the two main disa~ament plans in the course of genuine give-and-take negotiation. Perhaps the amount of progress
toward a settlement of the Berlin crisis and other East-West
issues may have something, or even very much, to do with progress
in disarmament. Perha ps other considerations of Soviet domestic
policy or Sino-Soviet relations are equally or more important.
In the meantime we hope to proceed with our work, to persevere
without falter,lng.
Now at last we have started the indispensable process of talking
about general and complete disarmament.
However long it takes and however much it may try our patience, I have the profound conviction that we must not, we cannot
~fford to stop our efforts to bring about general and complete
disarmament.
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List of organizations before which the addresses and statements were made, together with the dates and placesTHE CALL FOR LEADERSHIP. Address made by John J. McCloy at the International Industrial Conference sponsored
by the National Industrial Conference Board and Stanford Research Institute at San Francisco on Se.ptember
11, 1961.
W ORKING TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT WAR. Statement made
by Adlai E. Stevenson in Committee I (Political and Security) at the United Nations at New York on November 15, 1961.
U.S. OUTLINES INITIAL PROPOSALS OF PROGRAM FOR GENERAL
AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. Statement made by Dean
Rusk at the second plenary meeting of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva on March 15, 1962.
U.S. URGES SOVIET UNION To JOIN IN ENDING NUCLEAR
WEAPON TESTS. Statement made by Dean Rusk before
the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva on
March 23, 1962.
THE INITIATIVE FOR PEACE. Address made by William C. Foster before the School of Advanced International Studies
of Johns Hopkins University at Washington, D.C., on
May 4, 1962.
T HE NEW SEARCH FOR DISARMAMENT--Geneva 1962. Address
made by Arthur H. Dean before the Swiss Friends of
America at Zurich on May 10, 1962.
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